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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
INTRODUCTION
Each generation must conduct the corporate governance debate
within the parameters set by the prevailing manifestation of corporat-
ism.XEach phase of corporatism is marked by a "distinctive set of
problems to which the legal system has tried to respond by employing
regulatory strategies" appropriate for that stage.' Satisfactory solutions
to the current problems of corporate governance, therefore, cannot be
created from abstract formalisms or idealized models of the corporation.
Rather, to be effective, the corporate governance reforms proposed by
this generation must address the problems and relationships that char-
acterize the present state of American corporatism.
During the initial stage of corporatism, that of the nineteenth-cen-
tury entrepreneur,3 corporate governance posed few internal or external
concerns for society. Most businesses were essentially local. Corporate
managers were elected by, and responsible to, a concerned and cohesive
body of stockholders, usually the members of one or a few founding
families. Despite the rise of general incorporation, most states retained
strict limits on the size and scope of corporate activity."
During the final quarter of the nineteenth century, states began to
remove restrictions on corporate size, and it became permissible to in-
corporate "for any lawful purpose. ' Corporations grew in power and
complexity. Local opinion and the invisible hand of the marketplace
were no longer sufficient to ensure social well-being.' On the state
' Throughout this Article, the term "corporatism" refers to the interaction be-
tween a corporation and its various constituencies. The current phase of this dynamic
process is herein referred to as "finance corporatism." This can be distinguished from
the concept of "finance capitalism" put forth by Professor Robert Clark. See Clark, The
Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Treatises, 94
HARV. L. REV. 561, 562-75 (1981). Clark's notion pertains to the "institutional ar-
rangements for aggregating and channeling capital" that have changed over time in a
series of "stage[s] of capitalism." See id. at 561-62. "Corporatism" refers not only to
the development of capital-gathering arrangements, but also to the broader evolution of
a corporation's relationships with its constituencies, such as shareholders, employees,
and creditors, which are the proper subjects of any corporate governance debate.
2 Id. at 562.
3 See id.
" See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550-56 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (discussing size and scope limitations in northeastern states); see also E.M.
DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO MASSACHUSETTS (1954) (discussing early history of American corporations).
1 See Clark, supra note 1, at 562 n.4 (quoting Liggett, 288 U.S. at 555); Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 664
(1974) (analyzing the removal of restrictions on the size and power of businesses).
' See generally A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977) (discussing the increasingly active role of
the professional manager during this century).
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level, public utility commissions were created to regulate the rates and
services of natural monopolies.' Congress passed the Interstate Com-
merce Act' to regulate the railroads, and the Sherman' and Clayton 0
Acts to preserve the benefits of competition.
Corporatism advanced to its second stage, the age of the profes-
sional business manager. As noted by Berle and Means in their seminal
work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property," the distin-
guishing feature of this stage was the growth in the size of businesses
with a concomitant separation of ownership from control. 2 Berle and
Means raised the specter of professional managers, unchecked by a now
diffuse group of stockholders, acting for selfish rather than corporate
motives."3 The threatened social results were concentration of economic
power, a decrease in economic efficiency, and a misallocation of
resources.
The second stage of corporatism spawned regulation designed to
promote corporate responsibility to investors and to society at large.
Congress passed the federal securities laws in order to promote corpo-
rate responsibility to owners of the corporation.' 4 Congress then ex-
" See generally H. TRACHSEL, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 110-123 (1947)
(discussing the creation and development of public utility commissions).
8 Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 501-07, 521-
26, 10101-11917 (West Supp. 1987)).
1 Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985)).
"0 Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
11 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY (1932 & photo. reprint 1982).
12 See id. at 119-25.
Among the selfish motives discussed by Berle and Means is the possibility that
professional managers would act in order to increase managerial prerogatives, which
would tend to increase the power of the manager. As a consequence of management's
separation from ownership, it would not necessarily be the case that such power would
be exercised to benefit the corporation. See id. at 121-24.
"' The House of Representatives' debate leading to the Securities Act of 1933,
Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982
& Supp. III 1985)), demonstrates this general concern with ensuring the responsibility
of the professional manager to the owners of large corporations. See 77 CONG. REC.
2918 (1933) (statement of Rep. Rayburn). In discussing the objectives of his bill, Rep-
resentative Rayburn stated:
These hired officials of our great corporations . . . present a pitiable
spectacle. Five years ago they arrogated to themselves the greatest privi-
leges. They scorned the interference of the Government. They dealt with
their stockholders in the most arbitrary fashion. . . . Safe from the pitiless
publicity of Government supervision, unrestrained by Federal statute, free
from any formal control, these few men, proud, arrogant, and blind, drove
the country to financial ruin. . ..
• . . This bill undertakes to define the duty of officers of corporations
issuing securities, of syndicates underwriting issues, the duties of these cor-
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tended corporate responsibility by addressing the needs of labor, 5 con-
sumers, 6 and communities,'17 through a variety of legislation. In
addition, derivative and class actions provided private means for enforc-
ing internal and external corporate duties.' 8
We have reached yet a third stage of corporatism, the age of fi-
nance corporatism, which is dominated by the institutional investor and
the professional investment manager. 9 The existence of large pools of
porate officials to the investing public. It undertakes to fix responsibility
for information.
Id.
Similar concerns prompted the passage of additional securities regulation in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987)); the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6) (1982)), see 79 CONG. REc. 9042 (1935) (statement of
Sen. Wheeler) (addressing the purposes of the law); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
Pub. L. No. 76-253, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1982)), see
84 CONG. REc. 5007 (1939) (statement of Sen. Barkley); the Investment Company Act
of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1
to a-52 (1982 & West Supp. 1987)); and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L.
No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1982 &
West Supp. 1987)), see 86 CONG. REc. 9809 (1940) (statement of Rep. Cole).
15 See Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); National
Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). As Senator Wagner observed in
discussing the need to modify the National Labor Board, "the experience of everyone
connected with the National Labor Board has shown that no board alone can promote
cooperation and industrial peace." 78 CONG. REc. 3679 (1934), reprinted in NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 18-19
(1985).
16 See Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); HOUSE
CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 3419, THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
ACT, H.R. CONF. REPT. No. 1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22, reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4596, 4615-16 (discussing civil and criminal penalties
against management); SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, CONSUMER
PRODUCT SAFETY ACT, S. REP. No. 835, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1972
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4573, 4579 (adding findings and declaration of
policy to ensure the effectiveness of the protection of consumers from corporate
activities).
11 See Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, tit.
II, 84 Stat. 114 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4371-4375 (1982 & Supp. III
1985)); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 940, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 62-64, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2712, 2749-50 (discussing the importance of research
and monitoring of the impact of manufacturing activities on the environment).
18 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23.1 (specifying the requirements for bringing a derivative
action); FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (specifying the requirements for bringing a class action);
see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534-35 (1970) (describing the historical devel-
opment of the derivative action).
19 See Clark, supra note 1, at 564. The problems of this third stage and the ten-
sions among institutional investors, corporate managers, and other corporate constituen-
cies are now being recognized in the popular press and by academics. See, e.g., Kelley,
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capit.al managed to maximize short-term performance has fueled a
wave of highly leveraged takeovers that threatens a variety of constitu-
encies, including shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, and
communities, as well as the economy as a whole."0 At the same time,
the rise of the institutional investor also presents a unique opportunity
to bridge the gap between ownership and control. If properly chan-
neled, the institutional investor's power provides a means of making
management responsive to the needs of shareholders and other corpo-
rate constituencies.
The age of finance corporatism, therefore, requires a fresh ap-
praisal of the corporate governance issues first addressed by Berle and
Means over fifty years ago. Part I of this Article examines the abusive
takeover tactics that have become one of the hallmarks of finance corpo-
ratism. Part II reassesses the corporate governance debate in light of
these tactics and analyzes which of the affected constituencies are enti-
tled to managerial concern. Part III critiques certain suggested solu-
tions to the corporate governance problems of this age. Part IV pro-
poses a comprehensive legislative scheme to address these problems.
Part V suggests a mechanism by which corporations can achieve many
of the goals of the proposed legislative program through their own
devices.
I. THE TAKEOVER BOOM
The dominance and short-term investment strategy of the institu-
tional investor have dangerous implications for our economy. Takeovers
in the 1980's are driven by speculative, financial considerations rather
than by intrinsic business considerations. These takeovers have assumed
The New Dominant Investor, 9 DIREcTORS & BOARDS 15, 15 (1985); Nussbaum &
Dobrzynski, The Battle for Corporate Control, Bus. WK., May 18, 1987, at 102, 102;
Heard, Institutional Investors Are Flexing Their Muscles, Legal Times, October 24,
1983, at 11, col. 1; see also Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and
the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 639-45 (1985) (discussing the
limits of fiduciary duty); Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Crit-
ical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1145, 1162-75 (1984) (discussing the conflicts among corporate constituencies);
Gavin and Neilson, Individual v. Institutional Investors: Who Will Govern?,
N.Y.L.J., May 28, 1985, at 29, 29 (discussing difficulty of satisfying both institutional
and individual investors).
20 See Nussbaum & Dobrzynski, supra note 19, at 103 (discussing a hostile take-
over's effect on the target company's employees, suppliers, customers, and community);
Sheets, People Pay the Highest Price in a Takeover, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., July
22, 1985, at 51 (discussing the adverse impact of a takeover on employees and local
community); Norris, Not the Preferred Treatment: Proposed Uniroyal Buyout Hurts
One Class of Securities, Barron's, June 17, 1985, at 45, col. 1 (discussing negative
impact of a takeover on preferred stockholders).
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increasingly abusive forms, endangered a wide variety of constituencies,
and generated a host of powerful defensive responses. Modern solutions
to problems of corporate governance must address the rise of the insti-
tutional investor and its effect on the market for corporate control.
A. The Current Environment
1. Institutional Investors
The age of finance corporatism is dominated by the institutional
investor. "With $1.5 trillion-and soon to reach $2 trillion-in assets,
pension funds now own a third of the equity of all publicly traded
companies in the U.S., and 50% or more of the equity of the big
ones."2 To this must be added the holdings of mutual funds, banks,
savings institutions, and insurance companies.2
The managers of these institutional shareholders compete for
funds to manage, and are compensated on the basis of their investment
performance; a manager with below-average performance suffers a loss
of business and a decline in compensation.23 Consequently, institutional
investors are driven to maximize profits in the short term.24 They have
become enamored with options, futures, junk bonds, computer program
trading, and a host of other speculative devices designed to enhance
2 Drucker, A Crisis of Capitalism, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1986, at 32, col. 1, 32,
col. 3. Of the 1000 companies with the greatest market value, more than 75% have at
least 35% of their shares held by institutions. See The Top 1000 U.S. Companies
Ranked by Stock Market Valuation, Bus. WK., April 17, 1987, at 46 (listing the per-
centage of the nation's 1000 largest capitalized firms' shares held by institutions); see
also MONEY MARKET DIRECTORIES, INC., 1986 DIRECTORY OF PENSION FUNDS xiv-
xxii (1985) (providing statistics on the holdings of pension funds).
22 Mutual funds at the end of 1986 controlled assets totalling about $710 billion,
see INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1987 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 4 (1987),
while FSLIC-insured savings and loan institutions at the end of 1985 held about $1.07
trillion in assets, see FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, COMBINED FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS iv (1986), and property-casualty insurance companies at the end of 1985
held assets of approximately $311 billion, see BEST'S AGGREGATES & AVERAGES:
PROPERTY-CASUALTY 1986, at 2 (47th ed. 1986).
2 See Drucker, supra note 21, at 32, col. 1 ("And a[n investment]-fund manager
has little choice but to focus on the very shortest term; his own job depends on showing
immediate gains, with his performance in most cases judged quarter by quarter.").
24 See Ellsworth, Capital Markets and Competitive Decline, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 171, 171 (managerial "sense of duty to maximize shareholder
wealth" preoccupies American executives and "divert[s] attention from product-market
needs . . . frustrat[ing] efforts to improve competitiveness"). Institutional investment
managers in pursuit of short-term profits must also keep moving faster in order to stay
where they are. See M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 104-07
(1980); P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION 70-74 (1976); P. HARBRECHT, PEN-
SION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 107-19, 211 (1959).
19871
8 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
short-term performance.2 5 Their desire for quick profits has contrib-
uted to the current wave of highly leveraged takeovers to the detriment
of both undervalued companies and individual shareholders with a
long-term investment motive.2"
Institutional investors have become increasingly active in recent
years. "Institutional activism, especially among public pension funds,
may in fact become the principal legacy of the 1984 annual meeting
season. Institutional investors have been moving away for years from
the traditional posture of supporting management on controversial is-
sues at annual meetings. 1 7 They have channeled this activity into de-
fending their right to receive short-term profits. The 1986 annual meet-
ing season saw "continued growth in the activism of public pension
funds on corporate governance questions," with "more and more public
funds . . . voting against management proposals that they believe are
contrary to their [economic] interests."2
The ascendancy, increased activism, and short-term focus of the
institutional investor have significant implications for this age of corpo-
ratism. 9 Whatever the perceived vices of management control, manage-
2 See Saul, Hostile Takeovers: What Should Be Done?, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-
Oct. 1985, at 18, 19. One commentator attributes the rise to prominence of junk-bond
financing to the "willingness of institutional investors . . . to absorb such bonds in
almost any quantity into their portfolios." J. BROOKS, THE TAKEOVER GAME 190-91
(1987).
28 After learning that a takeover is being mounted, institutional investors and
arbitrageurs often take substantial positions in the stock of a prospective target, place
the target "in play," and then profit greatly when their stock is sold to an acquirer, or
another party, at a premium that maximizes the short-term value of the target's stock.
See The Place of Arbitrageurs in Mergers and Acquisitions, 21 MERGERS & ACQuIsI-
TIONS July-Aug. 1986, at 24; see also Warren, Accelerated Capital Recovery, Debt,
and Tax Arbitrage, 38 TAX LAW. 549 (1985) (emphasizing the special role of debt
and tax advantages for both arbitrageurs and fellow investors). The effect of the arbi-
trage mechanism is substantially strengthened by the followers it creates. See Rudnit-
sky, Sloan & Stern, The Wizard of Arb, FORBES, Dec. 15, 1986, at 38, 39.
One commentator has noted that the "'temporary owners'" that dominate the
current age of corporatism "play a role that can lead to the acquisition of corporate
assets through creative financing-for the purpose of reaping a forced assumption of
major debt by the corporation under attack." Smale, What About Shareowners' Re-
sponsibility?, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1987, at 28, col. 3.
27 Heard, Voting by Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance Questions:
1984 Proxy Season, 1984 CORP. GOVERNANCE SERVICE 1.
2 Mathiasen & Rosenbaum, Voting by Institutional Investors and 1986 Annual
Meeting Results, CORP. GOVERNANCE SERVICE, Oct. 1986, at 1, 33; see Nussbaum &
Dobrzynski, supra note 19, at 102 (noting an example of a large institutional investor
voting against management and predicting this is the wave of the future).
28 One commentator has compared the current situation with the decline of Brit-
ain in the late nineteenth century: "The clear lesson for America is that an investment
strategy that maximizes short-term profitability at the expense of long-term develop-
ment is hazardous to economic health; . . . '[w]e have about twenty years to reverse
this position before somebody else passes us'." Lessons from the Rise and Fall of Na-
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ment historically pursued socially beneficial objectives such as ex-
panding the enterprise, improving productivity, and cultivating
planning, research, and development. In contrast, the new control per-
sons-the institutional investors-share none of these social goals. Any
corporate governance proposal in the age of finance corporatism must
seek to channel the energy of institutional investors to recapture the
vital economic objectives of increased productivity through investment
in capital assets and research. 0
2. Tax and Accounting
Tax rules have long provided an environment conducive to highly
leveraged takeovers financed by low-quality debt. Tax rules encourage
the financing of takeovers with debt because interest payments are de-
ductible.31 This preference is magnified when a profitable company is
acquired in a leveraged transaction that substitutes debt for equity. By
proceeding in this manner, the raider gets the United States govern-
ment to finance part of the purchase.32
In addition, Section 338 of the Internal Revenue Code of 195433
permitted the purchaser of 80% of a corporation's stock to "step up"
the basis of the target's assets, with exceptions for certain recapture
items, thereby increasing the purchaser's ability to shelter income
through increased depreciation. 4 Through the use of "mirror" subsidi-
tions, WILSON CENTER REP., July/Aug. 1987, at 1 (quoting address by Professor
Rosencrance, The Wilson Center (June 3, 1987)).
30 One commentator has noted that with the concentration of ownership in the
hands of institutional investors, "the separation of control from responsibility may be-
come the key issue in the future." Margotta, Institutional Ownership of Stock. Implica-
tions for Long-Term Corporate Stability, 64 TAPPI 65, 69 (1981).
31 See generally SOLOMON, STEVENSON & SCHWARTZ, CORPORATIONS: LAW
AND POLICY 157 (1982) (discussing the tax aspects of the difference between debt and
preferred stock). Interest paid on corporate debt is a deductible business expense under
§ 163 of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 163 (1982 & West Supp. 1987), while
dividends paid on common and preferred stock are not deductible.
32 See Canellos, The Over-Leveraged Acquisition, 39 TAX LAW. 91, 100 (1985).
The acquiring firm typically channels the target's cash flow to pay off the fixed obliga-
tions incurred to acquire the business. See id. Through tax deductions for interest,
which is supplemented in some cases by enhanced depreciation resulting from a
stepped-up basis on the assets purchased, the buying group uses pre-tax cash flow to
the maximum extent. See id. The U.S. government in effect finances a large part of the
purchase price because the forgone federal income tax revenue is essentially a govern-
ment expenditure.
as Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 107 (current version at I.R.C. § 338
(1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987)). Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, an
acquirer wishing to step up the basis of the target's assets must be willing to absorb the
tax on any gain. See I.R.C. §§ 336, 338 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
34 This ability was further enhanced by the use of "accelerated depreciation
schedules that may bear little relation to the economic life of the assets." Saul, supra
1987]
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aries an acquirer, unlike the target, could avoid tax on divestiture of
unwanted assets. 5
Accounting rules also favor the acquisition of existing assets over
the internal development of new ones. While the costs of an acquisition
are capitalized and amortized over an extended period,36 a current
charge against income must generally be taken for the costs of starting
a new business, 37 research and development, 8 or introducing new
products.3 9 Tax and accounting considerations, therefore, provide an
note 25, at 19.
'5 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, an
acquirer wishing to use the mirror technique would create as many subsidiaries as the
target had subsidiaries or divisions that it wished to be able to sell without recognizing
gain. The subsidiaries would be capitalized with the financing for the acquisition and
would jointly own the acquisition vehicle, that is, the actual person making the tender
offer. Once the acquisition vehicle acquired the target, it would be merged into the
target, with the result that the acquirer's subsidiaries would jointly own the target. The
target would then be liquidated, with its divisions and subsidiaries distributed to the
acquirer's subsidiaries. Even if the target's assets had appreciated, this would be a tax-
free distribution under § 332 of the 1954 Code, Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A
Stat. 102 (current version at I.R.C. § 332 (1982 & West Supp. 1987)), because it
would be viewed as the liquidation of a subsidiary (i.e., the target) jointly owned by the
acquirer's subsidiaries, who would be entitled to aggregate their interests for this pur-
pose. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-34 (1966). The acquirer could then sell the stock of its
mirror subsidiaries, and dispose of unwanted target assets, while recognizing little if
any gain because the acquirer would likely have something approaching a fair market
value basis in the stock of its subsidiaries. After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, there is
some question as to whether aggregation of interests among the acquirer's subsidiaries,
which is an integral part of the scheme, continues to survive. See I.R.C. § 337(c) (1982
& West Supp. 1987) (defining the distributee after liquidation as "the corporation"); 2
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 202 n.9, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4075, 4290 n.9 (suggesting that the Treasury Depart-
ment consider whether the aggregation rules should continue to apply).
"B See BUSINESS COMBINATIONS, APB Opinion No. 16, 1 76 (Am. Inst. of Certi-
fied Pub. Accountants 1970); 2 APB ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES, Accounting Interpreta-
tion No. 33 of APB Opinion No. 16 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1971)
(noting, for example, that a finder's fee and fees paid to outside consultants for account-
ing, legal, or engineering investigations relating to an acquisition are capitalized).
11 See ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING BY DEVELOPMENT STAGE ENTERPRISES,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 7, % 10 (Fin. Accounting Standards
Bd. 1975) (treating development stage enterprises like any other enterprise and thereby
increasing difficulty of capitalizing start-up costs); Kerley, Intangible Assets, in 1 Ac-
COUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 23.21 (1981) ("Deferral of start-up and preoperating costs is
not routine because of the difficulty of assigning benefits to future periods and the
possibility that costs will not be recovered from future operations.").
38 See ACCOUNTING FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS, Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 2, 1 12 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1974)
("All research and development costs encompassed by this statement shall be charged to
expense when incurred.").
" See INTANGIBLE ASSETS, APB Opinion No. 17 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1970) (setting standards for deferral of expenses connected to intangible
assets); Charles, Other Assets and Research and Development, in HANDBOOK OF AC-
COUNTING AND AUDITING 21-14 (1981) (noting that deferral of advertising and pro-
motion expenditures "was and continues to be infrequent").
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artificial impetus to highly leveraged acquisitions. Although a more
thorough analysis of such concerns is beyond the scope of this Article,
any reform of corporate governance must consider the consequences of
the relevant tax and accounting rules.
B. Abusive Takeover Tactics
1. The Highly Leveraged Takeover
Most prominent among the speculative, abusive takeover tactics
spawned by the age of finance corporatism is the "junk-bond, bust-up"
takeover. In such a takeover, junk bonds (non-investment grade securi-
ties with high rates of return) allow a raider to make a 100% cash offer
for a target of almost any size. If successful in obtaining a controlling
interest, the raider merges the target into itself and sells assets of the
target to help finance the acquisition.4 The junk-bond, bust-up take-
over was born in early 1984 when Drexel Burnham Lambert arranged
junk financing for T. Boone Pickens' bid for Gulf Oil.41 By mid-1985,
the flow of junk-financed takeovers had become "an avalanche." '42
40 A classic example of the junk-bond, bust-up takeover was Pantry Pride's acqui-
sition of Revlon. Pantry Pride ultimately acquired Revlon by means of a $1.7 billion
hostile tender offer, backed by $725 million in junk bonds. Within one year of the
acquisition, Pantry Pride sold Revlon's Norcliff Thayer, Reheis, and Beecham subsidi-
aries for $395 million, Revlon's ethical pharmaceuticals business for $690 million, and
Revlon's Technicon subsidiary for $300 million. See Pantry Pride Takes an Ax to
Revlon, Bus. WK., Dec. 9, 1985, at 46; Siconolfi, Revlon Will Sell Technicon Unit for
$300 Million, Wall St. J., June 3, 1986, at 23, col. 3; Pantry Pride to Sell Revlon
Unit to Rorer, L.A. Times, Nov. 30, 1985, pt. 4, at 2, col. 3. In sum, nearly $1.4
billion of Revlon's assets were sold to finance Pantry Pride's purchase.
4 See K. BIALKIN, A. FLEISCHER & E. GREENE, NEw TECHNIQUES IN AcQuIsI-
TIONS & TAKEOVERS 70-73 (1985).
42 Brady, Equity Is Lost in junk-Bondage, N.Y. Times, April 25, 1985, at A27,
col. 1, A27, col. 3. Recent examples include the $5.4 billion in junk financing for Tur-
ner Broadcasting System Inc.'s bid for CBS Inc.; $3.9 billion in junk financing in Rev-
lon Group Inc.'s bid for Gillette Co.; $3 billion in junk financing in Mesa Partners' bid
for Unocal Corp.; $1.5 billion in junk financing in Icahn Group Inc.'s bid for Phillips
Petroleum Co.; $725 million in junk financing in Pantry Pride Inc.'s bid for Revlon
Inc.; $550 million in junk financing in Reliance Financial Services Corp.'s bid for Walt
Disney Productions; $400 million in junk financing in Sir James Goldsmith's bid for
Crown Zellerbach Corp.; and $365 million in junk financing in Triangle Industries
Inc.'s bid for National Can Corp. See Scredon & Wilke, Time Is Running Out on Ted
Turner's Bid for CBS, Bus. WK., July 22, 1985, at 68 (Turner-CBS); Belkin, Gillette
Deal Ends Revlon Bid, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1986, at D1, col. 6, D9, col. 2 (Revlon-
Gillette); Whitefield, "Junk Bond" Financiers Back Pickens, L.A. Times, April 18,
1985, pt. 4, at 1, col. 1 (Mesa-Unocal); Cole, Icahn Gets Drexel Aid on Phillips, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 16, 1985, at 29, col. 6 (Icahn-Phillips); Cole, Pantry Pride Revlon Bid
Raised by $1.75 a Share, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1985, at 34, col. 1 (Pantry Pride-
Revlon); Bleakley, The Power and Perils ofJunk Bonds, N.Y. Times, April 14, 1985,
§ 3, at 1, col. 4 (Reliance-Disney); Sivy, Separating Junk from Toxic Waste, MONEY,
June 1985, at 169, 169-70 (Goldsmith-Crown Zellerbach); Weiss, Will Corporate
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Thus, while bond issues represented only 0.3% of tender offer financing
for the years 1981 through 1984,"' one study concluded that, in the first
half of 1985, junk bonds accounted for 13.6% of all successful tender
offer financing and 24.7% of hostile tender offer financing."" Another
study concluded that debt financing accounted for 16% of all tender
offer financing in 1985 and 29% of such financing for the first nine
months of 1986."'
The dramatic increase in junk-bond takeovers caused concern in
several quarters. In January of 1986, over the objections of other gov-
ernment agencies, the Federal Reserve Board interpreted existing mar-
gin regulations to cover the use of shell corporations to make junk-bond
tender offers.46 As a consequence, a raider seeking to collateralize its
loans by using a shell subsidiary corporation to issue junk bonds may
now leverage no more than 50% of a takeover transaction. There was
speculation that the Federal Reserve Board's action would sound the
death knell for the junk-financed takeover.4 7 The Federal Reserve
Board's margin regulations, however, do not affect junk financing if
preferred stock is used rather than debt, or if a raider is willing to use
its own assets as collateral.48 In such cases, the raider may leverage as
much of a takeover transaction as it likes.49 As a consequence, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board's margin regulations have had little, if any, impact
Raiders Have to Kiss the Junk Bond Good-bye?, Bus. WK., Dec. 16, 1985, at 74
(Triangle-National Can).
"s See H. SHERMAN & R. SCHRAGER, JUNK BONDS AND TENDER OFFER Fi-
NANCING 16 (1987).
44 See STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER
PROTECTION, AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
99TH CONG., 2D SFSS., CORPORATE MERGERS AND HIGH YIELD [JUNK] BONDS: RE-
CENT MARKET TRENDS AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 14 (Comm. Print 1986)
[hereinafter CORPORATE MERGERS].
45 See H. SHERMAN & R. SCHRAGER, supra note 43, at 16-17. But see CORPO-
RATE MERGERS, supra note 44, at 51.
48 See 51 Fed. Reg. 1771, 1775 (1986) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 207). In
such a takeover, the shell acquirer's prospective assets-for example, the stock of a
target company-effectively are collateral for takeover loans.
'7 See Shareholder Protection Act: Hearings on S-1539 Before the New Jersey
Senate Comm. on Labor, Industry, and Professions, Testimony of Securities Industry
Ass'n 3 (Mar. 24, 1986) (statement of Stephen Blumenthal, vice president and director
of Regulatory Relations for S.I.A.).
48 See 51 Fed. Reg. 1771, 1771 (1986) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 207) ("The
presumption that the debt securities are indirectly secured by margin stock would not
apply if there is specific evidence that lenders could in good faith rely on assets other
than margin stock as collateral, such as a guaranty of the debt securities by the shell
corporation's parent company or another company that has substantial non-margin
stock assets or cash flow.").
9 For example, the Federal Reserve Board's margin regulations did nothing to
stop Revlon from financing $3.9 billion of a $4.1 billion bid for Gillette with junk
bonds. See Belkin, supra note 42, at D1, col. 6.
[Vol. 136:1
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
on the use of junk bonds for takeover financing.5"
2. Bridge Financing
Bridge financing, occasioned by the changing role of investment
bankers in merger and acquisition activity, has also contributed to the
recent wave of speculative, highly leveraged takeovers. Deregulation
and increased competition among the investment houses have reduced
their traditional sources of revenue, the commissions charged for trad-
ing stocks and underwriting securities offerings. 5' Investment banks
have filled the gap with the higher profits of junk-bond offerings and
the substantial fees charged for merger and acquisition services.52
These institutions, moreover, have begun to protect their enormous
stake in takeover deals by placing their own capital at risk and per-
forming a "merchant banking" function.53 A manifestation of this trend
is the provision by investment banks of "bridge financing" for acquisi-
tions.54 In a typical transaction, the investment bank provides financing
with the intention of refinancing and obtaining permanent capital
through commercial bank loans, the sale of junk bonds, or the sale of
target assets. In the words of Samuel L. Hayes III, a Harvard Business
School professor of investment banking, the investment banking profes-
sion has experienced a "steady movement away from the traditional
role as counselor toward activity initiated by the investment banker
himself."55
A number of recent deals have contained bridge financing. For ex-
50 See J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 277 (noting that the Federal Reserve's rule
"had virtually no practical effect because it could be circumvented by the use of pre-
ferred stock . . .and because hostile takeovers were no longer being done by shell
companies"); H. SHERMAN & R. SCHRAGER, supra note 43, at 15 ("Takeover profes-
sionals believe that the Fed ruling has had little or no impact on the role of junk bonds
in takeover financing.")
" See J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 8-12; Bianco, American Business Has a New
Kingpin: The Investment Banker, Bus. WK., Nov. 24, 1986, at 77, 80.
2 See J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 103, 243-53; Bianco, supra note 51, at 80.
" See J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 198-99; Survey of Wall Street, ECONOMIST,
July 11, 1987, at Supp. 9-13.
"5 Another manifestation of the trend toward merchant banking involves partici-
pation by investment banks in leveraged buy outs. See, e.g., infra note 96.
"I Bianco, supra note 51, at 80 (quoting Professor Hayes). An extreme example
of this trend toward banker-initiated activity is charged by Staley Continental, Inc. in
its recent complaint against Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. Staley charges Drexel with
putting targets in play through stock accumulation and manipulation with the goal of
creating a takeover bid by one of its clients or, in Staley's case, of forcing management
to accept a Drexel-sponsored leveraged buy out. Drexel denies the charge. See Stewart
& Hertzberg, Expanding Inquiry: Drexel and Milken Are Focus of Federal Probe
That Is Growing Wider, Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1987, at 1, col. 6; Welles & Frank, Did
Drexel Bully Takeover Candidates?, Bus. WK., Mar. 9, 1987, at 43, 43.
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ample, First Boston provided $865 million to help Campeau Corp. ac-
quire Allied Stores Corp.5" Shearson Lehman Brothers offered $1.6 bil-
lion to Campeau's rival, Edward DeBartolo.5" Merrill Lynch offered
$1.9 billion to Sir James Goldsmith to help him pursue his unsuccess-
ful bid for the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,58 provided $650 million
to sponsor a leveraged buy out of Borg-Warner to defeat a bid for that
company by GAF corporation, and provided $725 million in bridge fi-
nancing to sponsor a leveraged buy out of Supermarkets General Cor-
poration in the face of a bid from the Dart Group.5"
Bridge financing exacerbates the dangers of highly leveraged take-
overs by making it easier for raiders to pose a credible threat and put
targets "in play." Once a target is in play, risk arbitrageurs, including
trading desks at investment banking firms, invest large amounts in
takeover stocks."0 After arbitrageurs take control of a large fraction of
the target's stock, sale of the company, or a defensive maneuver to max-
imize short-term value, becomes almost a self-fulfilling prophecy.6
Just as investment banks are beginning to play a merchant bank-
ing role by providing bridge loans, commercial banks are beginning to
play an investment banking role in order to cash in on the huge fees
generated by the present environment. Erosion of the Glass-Steagall
" See Welles & Farrell, Now Drexel Burnham Is Fighting on Two Fronts, Bus.
WK., Feb. 16, 1987, at 90, 96.
57 See id.
" See id.
" See Horowitz, Merrill Lynch Downplays Bridge Loan Role, AM. BANKER,
April 27, 1987, at 3, 3.
'0 See Bianco, supra note 51, at 80 (Wall Street's block trading and risk-arbitrage
desks make it possible to amass an enormous block of shares in almost any company on
short notice). It is estimated that risk arbitrageurs have grown from a cadre of about a
dozen firms and individuals investing a hundred million dollars or so in the mid-1970's
to an army of more than 200 with aggregate capital of as much as $15 billion. See
Metz, Trading Abuses Run Deep on Wall Street, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1987, at 31,
col. 1.
81 The takeover of Avco may be cited as a classic example:
Leucadia National, a much smaller company, took a position in Avco and
then announced a tender offer. It withdrew when Avco paid it off in what
amounted to a greenmail transaction. The Wall Street Journal reported
that the arbitrageurs were upset by this turn of events and some, expecting
another tender offer, decided to hold their positions in Avco.
In quick succession, the Irwin Jacobs group took a 12% position in
Avco, Ivan Boesky, the arbitrageur, bought 8% of Avco's shares in the
open market, and Textron announced a tender offer. Under its agreement
with Avco, Leucadia received the benefits of Textron's premium price to
Avco shareholders. Thus, three groups of takeover entrepreneurs and the
arbitrageurs received millions in quick profits while Textron loaded itself
with debt.
Saul, supra note 25, at 20.
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Act, which prohibits commercial banks from underwriting securities, 2
has helped commercial banks play an expanded role in the financial
arena. 83 For example, a recent court decision condoned a commercial
bank's placement of commercial paper issued by third parties.64 Major
commercial banks, such as Citicorp and Morgan Guaranty, have ex-
panded their role in the financial arena by providing both financing
and merger and acquisition services.65 The merging of the investment
and commercial banking functions results in an artificial stimulation of
deals, which are pursued to create fees rather than to increase intrinsic
value.66
3. Partial Bids
The rise of takeover bids, mounted in order to garner speculative,
short-term profits, has resulted in a number of abusive techniques
based on the raider's purchase of less than 100% of the target's stock.
Such techniques deny material information to the target's shareholders,
pressure the target's shareholders into selling their stock, treat the tar-
get's shareholders unequally, and minimize the price that target share-
holders receive for their stock. These techniques include creeping ac-
quisitions, sweeping the street, partial tender offers, and two-tiered
tender offers.
a. Creeping Acquisitions
Under current rules, a raider, sometimes acting through a group of
persons, can quietly begin buying a target company's stock up to a level
62 See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982) (commercial banks "shall not underwrite any issue
of securities or stock").
63 See J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 303 ("The inescapable truth is that ...
investment banking has changed so much that Glass-Steagall [is] left as a rule without
a game."); Fidler, Why Commercial Banks Look for Liberalisation, Fin. Times, June
16, 1987, § 2, at VI, col. 1 (citing a "gradual erosion" of the Glass-Steagall Act, which
has resulted in commercial banks now dealing in an estimated 80% of securities issues
in the United States). But see Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-86, tit. II, § 201(b), 101 Stat. 552, 582 (placing temporary moratorium on in-
creases in underwriting by commercial banks).
64 See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052, 1067-70
(D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Fidler, supra note 63, § 2, at VI, col. 1 ("Recent rulings
[have allowed] banks to underwrite issues in the rapidly growing commercial paper
market.").
65 See J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 302; Wayne, Latest Corporate Takeovers
Involve More Than Just Paper, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1987, § 4, at 26, col. 1.
66 As James Walter, a finance professor at the Wharton School of the University
of Pennsylvania, has stated: "There are too many middlemen just going for the fees
when they should be looking at the quality of the loans [they extend]." Bianco & Far-
rell, Power on Wall Street, Bus. WK., July 7, 1986, at 56, 58.
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just short of 5% of the target's outstanding shares, the point at which
public disclosure is required."7 The actual purchases are typically made
through obscure corporations and partnerships in order to keep the
identity of the raider secret.68 Before crossing the Williams Act 5%
threshold, at which point the raider has 10 days to make a public dis-
closure of its target company holdings,"9 the raider firms up its buying
group and obtains the financing required for its planned stock
purchases. The raider then crosses the 5% threshold and commences a
vigorous, open market purchase program. Usually an acquirer will be
able to accumulate up to 10% or even 20% of the target's shares in that
10-day period before disclosing such purchases or any aspect of its
plans. 0
Creeping acquisitions are problematic for several reasons. First,
they enable raiders to profit solely by putting a target "in play," even if
the raider has no intention of acquiring the target at a price that re-
flects the full value of the target's shares. Merely accumulating shares
may identify a company as a "target," engender a tender offer at a
premium by a third party, or force a sale of the target or restructuring
to raise share values and avert a takeover." Second, creeping acquisi-
tions deny selling shareholders full and fair disclosure with respect to
the raider's initial purchases. Had the raider's control intent been dis-
closed, target shareholders selling in the open market would have de-
manded a higher price for their shares.7 2 Third, creeping acquisitions
deny target shareholders an equal opportunity to share in the control
premium resulting from the target's sale.73 Finally, creeping acquisi-
tions deprive the target's board of the opportunity to structure an alter-
native transaction that might have maximized share values for all target
shareholders. 4
87 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982).
68 See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS § 2.02[2]
(1986).
68 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a) (1987).
70 See J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 259.
71 Id. at 260.
712 See Testimony of Martin Lipton Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (July 9, 1987) [hereinafter Testimony of Martin Lipton]
(author's transcript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). For a
discussion of creeping acquisitions, see generally 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER,
supra note 68, at § 2.02[2], 2-26.
"' Testimony of Martin Lipton, supra note 72, at 16.
74 Id.
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b. Sweeping the Street
"Sweeping the street" currently is a fashionable method of ob-
taining control of a target through large purchases on the open market.
Such acquisitions have been made possible due to recent court holdings
that such open market purchases are beyond the scope of the Williams
Act.7 5 In several cases, large accumulations of stock through open mar-
ket purchases have been made by the raider following the termination
of a previously announced tender offer. For example, Campeau Corpo-
ration dropped its takeover bid for Allied Stores and obtained control of
Allied Stores after purchasing a block assembled by Jeffries & Co.
from a small number of large holders." Hanson utilized the same tech-
nique to acquire control of SCM. 7
The chief disadvantages of sweeping the street are similar to those
of creeping acquisitions. The raider's purchases are made without the
benefit of Williams Act disclosures. Small, unsophisticated shareholders
are denied an equal opportunity to sell their shares at a premium. In
addition, the target's board is given no opportunity to structure an al-
ternative transaction that maximizes the value of the target's shares.7
c. Partial Tender Offers
A partial tender offer is a bid to purchase a controlling but less
than 100% interest in a target." Such a tender offer is abusive because
75 See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57-58 (2d Cir.
1985) (Hanson's purchase of 25% of SCM stock was not a tender offer because a small
number of sophisticated investors was involved, there was no pressure on stockholders
to sell, no public solicitation was used, no premium was paid, no fixed term was set,
and the purchase was not contingent on Hanson obtaining a fixed amount of stock.);
SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 760 F.2d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 1985) (Carter
Hawley's repurchase of a large quantity of stock was not a tender offer because "[its]
purchases were made in the open market, at market and not premium prices, without
fixed terms and were not contingent upon the tender of a fixed minimum number of
shares."); see also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., Nos. 9281, 9221 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 15, 1987) (upholding street sweep by target's largest shareholder under Dela-
ware law). Such purchases do not of themselves constitute "tender offers" within the
meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982) and, as a consequence, do not fall within the
ambit of the Williams Act.
71 See Toronto's Campeau Buys Allied on the Open Market, DUN'S Bus.
MONTH, Dec. 1986, at 22, 22.
7 See Hanson Trust PLC, 774 F.2d at 51 (Hanson dropped its cash tender offer
in favor of obtaining SCM stock through private purchases.). Hanson subsequently
completed its acquisition of SCM. See Dodsworth, Hanson Lifts SCM Stake to 66%,
Fin. Times, Jan. 8, 1986, § 1, at 19.
78 See SEC, Commission to Consider Three Items at Open Meeting (Sept. 14,
1987) (SEC news release No. 87-62) (suggesting rules that would prevent market
sweeps immediately following termination of a tender offer).
79 See Finkelstein, Antitakeover Protection Against Two-Tier and Partial Tender
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it allows a raider to gain control of a target and hold a minority interest
captive, with little protection for the stockholder against self-dealing or
a squeeze-out merger.80 Indeed, the threat to the shareholder of being
locked into such a minority position provides a strong incentive for her
to tender.8 '
d. Two-Tiered Tender Offers
The two-tiered tender offer, by contrast, gives the raider a mecha-
nism for forcing target shareholders to tender because the squeeze-out
merger is an announced part of the deal.82 In such an offer, the raider
makes a cash tender offer for a controlling interest in the target and,
upon obtaining control, merges the target into itself at a lower second-
tier price and usually in exchange for securities.
State appraisal law provides the only protection against the two-
tiered tender offer.8" While most states guarantee "fair value" to share-
holders who dissent from the merger,"' appraisal laws are burdened
with complicated procedural requirements,85 and fair value normally
Offers: The Validity of Fair Price, Mandatory Bid, and Flip-Over Provisions Under
Delaware Law, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 291, 291-93 (1984).
80 See Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128, 1137 (D. Or. 1984)
(noting that an acquisition of a 51% interest would "subject the remaining stockholders
to a captive status").
1 See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 631 (D. Md.
1982); Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Bebchuk, To-
ward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1695, 1710-13 (1985); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Merg-
ers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 337 (1974); Finkelstein, supra note 79, at
293; Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legisla-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 307-08 (1983); Note, Protecting Shareholders Against
Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1964, 1966 (1984).
82 In a classic example, U.S. Steel offered to purchase 51% of Marathon Oil Com-
pany's stock in 1981 for $125 per share in cash with the announced intention of acquir-
ing the minority interest in Marathon in a second-step merger for securities worth
approximately $86 per share. See Note, Second Step Transactions in Two-Tiered
Takeovers: The Case for State Regulation, 19 GA. L. REV. 343, 348 (1985); see also
SEC, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS: REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS
24-26 (1983) [hereinafter TENDER OFFER RECOMMENDATIONS] (recommending regu-
latory disincentive to two-tiered bids).
83 See Note, supra note 82, at 366-67.
See id. at 367; see also, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-373 to -374 (1987)
(Any dissenting shareholder is entitled to have the corporation "purchase his shares at
fair value."); FLA. STAT. § 607.247(2) (1979 & Supp. 1987) (In the event of a merger,
a dissenting shareholder may demand the corporation pay "fair value" for her shares.).
80 See Note, supra note 82, at 367; see also, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33.374
(1986) (the shareholder has 15 days from the "date of mailing the plan of merger" to
notify the corporation of her dissent; her stock must not be voted in favor of the merger;
the corporation has 10 days from the receipt of the shareholder's demand or from the
date of the merger (whichever is later) to offer the shareholder "fair value" for her
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excludes any portion of the tender offer premium or any synergistic
gains flowing from the merger.8 6 As a consequence, state appraisal law
allows a wide divergence between the first and second-tier prices,' thus
leaving untouched the most coercive element of the two-tiered offer.
The difference in the prices of the tiers unfairly pressures the tar-
get shareholder. A shareholder who would prefer that the target remain
independent will usually tender anyway out of fear that a majority of
her fellow shareholders will tender, leaving her squeezed out of her
investment at the lower second-tier price.8 ' Moreover, because individ-
uals do not possess the same access to information or investment skills
as institutional investors, they are less likely to respond quickly and
efficiently to takeover bids and are more likely to be saddled with the
lower second-tier price.8 9
While the number of two-tiered tender offers has declined as the
availability of junk-bond financing has increased, there is no guarantee
that this technique will remain dormant. The takeover process is dy-
namic. To the extent that junk-bond financing declines-as a conse-
shares; the shareholder shall deliver her certificates to the corporation within 20 days of
"demanding the purchase of [her] shares;" the corporation or shareholder may petition
the court to determine the "fair value" of the stock); FLA. STAT. § 607.247(6-10)
(1979) (covering, among other items, the deadline for the corporation and shareholder
to agree on the fair value of the stock; the procedure, in the event of non-agreement, for
the corporation to petition the court to determine the fair value of the stock; the imposi-
tion of court costs on the corporation for such a proceeding (unless the court determines
that the refusal of the shareholders to accept the fair value is "arbitrary or vexatious or
not in good faith"); and the procedure for the dissenting stockholder to surrender her
certificates to the corporation).
88 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983) (defining appraisal value as "fair
value exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation
of the merger"). But see N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(h)(4) (McKinney 1986) ("fair
value" may include the effects of the merger on the corporation and its shareholders).
87 See Note, supra note 82, at 368.
8 The coercive nature of the two-tiered tender offer has been widely recognized.
See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 630 (D. Md.
1982) ("If the [tender] offer is in fact 'coercive,' it would only be because its two-tier
structure is revealed."); Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982)
(A two-tiered tender offer is inherently coercive.); Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note
81, at 337 ("[A]n announced disparity between the tender and the merger figures
would deprive [the] stockholders of their ability to make an unforced, independent
judgement."); Finkelstein, supra note 79, at 293 (Two-tier tender offers "put pressure
on shareholders to tender their shares to avoid being frozen out for lesser consideration
in the second-step transaction." (footnote omitted)); Lowenstein, supra note 81, at 308
("The two-tier pricing structure was concededly intended . . . to coerce shareholders
into tendering at the first."); Note, supra note 81, at 1966 (The two-tier tender offer
"maximizes the coercion inherent in the tender offer process.").
8 See Scriggins & Clarke, Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland Fair Price Legis-
lation, 43 MD. L. REv. 266, 271 n.22 (1984); Note, supra note 82, at 352-54; Com-
ment, Front-End Loaded Tender Offers: The Application of Federal and State Law to
an Innovative Corporate Acquisition Technique, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 389, 409 (1982).
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quence, perhaps, of the recent Wall Street insider trading scandals, leg-
islative reforms, economic or other reasons-the two-tiered tender offer
may well experience a resurgence.9"
C. The Effects of Abusive Takeovers
1. Debt Creation
Abusive takeovers have increased the amount of debt in our econ-
omy to extraordinary proportions. In addition to the debt assumed by
raiders in order to mount takeover bids, target companies have also as-
sumed huge amounts of debt as defensive measures. 1 Assumption of
debt to allow stock repurchases has been employed to defeat hostile
tender offers 2 and as a prophylactic measure to boost the stock prices
90 SEC Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest has recently questioned the complete-
ness and logic of legislation that restricts hostile two-tiered offers without restricting
management-supported two-tiered offers and self-tenders. See Address by J. Grundfest,
Two-Tier Tender Offers: A Mythectomy, United Shareholders Association Annual
Meeting (June 5, 1987) and the National Association of Manufacturer's Congress of
American Industry, Government Regulation and Competition Session (May 27, 1987)
(on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). However, in the absence of
a comprehensive legislative program designed to remove all barriers to shareholder
choice, the rationale for distinguishing between hostile and board-supported two-tiered
offers is clear. The board is bound to act in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of the
company's shareholders, and its actions are closely scrutinized by the courts. See, e.g.,
Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 885-86 (6th Cir. 1986) (directors breached
fiduciary duty by "rubber stamping" a management buy out proposal that was less
advantageous to shareholders than an outside bid); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM
Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274-77 (2d Cir. 1986) (directors' fiduciary duty to
shareholders includes the duty to acquire and analyze material information about an
offer and the duty to monitor outside advice regarding an offer); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (invalidating
certain defensive tactics because, once a decision had been made to sell the target, "ob-
taining the highest price for the benefit of the target's stockholders should have been the
central theme guiding director action"); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton &
Co., 519 A.2d 103, 113-15 (Del. Ch. 1986) (enjoining a target's self-tender because it
was unnecessarily coercive and precluded the target's shareholders from choosing to
tender into a pre-existing offer). A raider is bound by no such fiduciary duty and may
act purely in its own self-interest.
91 See J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 192 (Phillips Petroleum, Unocal, and CBS
had to assume large amounts of debt to defend against hostile takeovers.); Jonas &
Berger, Do All These Deals Help or Hurt the U.S. Economy?, Bus. WK., Nov. 24,
1986, at 86, 86 ("[E]xecutives . . . are loading up their companies with high risk debt
to stave off raiders."); Cowan, The Allure of Stock Buybacks, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5,
1987, at D1, col. 3 (noting that stock repurchases totalled $45 billion in 1986 and $8
billion for the first two months of 1987).
9'2 For example, Union Carbide engaged in a stock repurchase program, backed
by $2.5 billion in debt securities, to defeat GAF's junk-bond, bust-up bid. See UNION
CARBIDE CORP., AMENDMENT No. 4 TO RULE 13E-1 INFORMATION AND SCHEDULE
13E-4 ISSUER TENDER OFFER STATEMENT 3-5 (Jan. 3, 1986) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review); Wiener, Deals of the Year, FORTUNE, Feb. 2,
1987, at 68, 68.
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of potential targets,93 or to make a company's balance sheet less attrac-
tive to raiders.9 4 Targets that have paid greenmail to defeat abusive,
highly leveraged takeover bids often make a premium repurchase from
other stockholders in order to increase leverage and discourage yet an-
other greenmail attempt. 5 Targets and potential targets have also re-
sorted to leveraged buy outs96 and recapitalizations, which are, in ef-
fect, public leveraged buy outs." Typically, the proportion of debt
capital in a large deal is as high as 90%.9
The amount of debt produced by, and in reaction to, abusive take-
overs is staggering. "Over the two years 1984 and 1985, the debt of
nonfinancial corporations rose by $384 billion, while equity contracted
by $99 billion. This contraction comprises the total of retained earn-
ings, which were a positive $53 billion, and net new equity issuance,
" See, e.g., Nussbaum, Deal Mania, Bus. WK., Nov. 24, 1986, at 74, 75 (noting
that Westinghouse Electric Corp.'s plan to repurchase 20% of its equity helped boost
the price of its stock from $33 to $58, thereby increasing the company's capitalization
and making it more expensive for raiders to be successful).
9' See Levine & Lykos, Recent Developments in Defensive Strategies, 1 HOSTILE
BATTLES FOR CORP. CONTROL 105, 108 (1985); Jonas & Berger, supra note 91, at
87.
" After purchasing Sir James Goldsmith's stock at a profit to Goldsmith of ap-
proximately $93 million, Goodyear assumed substantial debt to allow repurchase of 40
million of its remaining 109 million shares at a cost of $2.6 million. See Hicks,
Goodyear Buys Out Goldsmith, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1986, at D1, col. 6. CPC Inter-
.national, Inc. and Gillette both bought back Ronald Perelman's (Revlon Group's
Chairman) stake in their companies, see Belkin, Gillette Deal Ends Revlon Bid, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 25, 1986, at D1, col. 6; C6le, Perelman Is Said to Sell CPC Stake, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 6, 1986, at D1, col. 3; Miller & Hall, CPC to Buy Perelmar Stake from
Its Banker, Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1986, at 3, col. 1, and then announced substantial
debt-financed repurchasing programs. See Miller & Watkins, Gillette Blocks Takeover
Move; Stock Slumps, Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1986, at 5, col. 1; Miller & Hall, supra, at
3, col. 2. Federated Department Stores paid $88.88 per share to buy back the Haft
family's 4.5% stake in their company and announced a stock repurchase program. See
Bianco, A Flurry of Greenmailing Has Stockholders Cursing, Bus. WK., Dec. 8, 1986,
at 32, 32-33.
" For example, Merrill Lynch Capital Partners recently consummated a $4.23
billion leveraged buy-out of Borg-Warner to defeat a takeover bid by GAF Corpora-
tion. See Borg-Warner Corp. Holders Approve Merger, Dow Jones News Wire, July
30, 1987; Cole, GAF Withdraws Its Bid for Borg, N.Y. Times, April 28, 1987, at D1,
col. 3; Cole, Merrill Unit to Acquire Borg, N.Y. Times, April 13, 1987, at D1, col. 6.
In connection with the deal, Merrill Lynch received $31.5 million in investment bank-
ing fees. See Borg-Warner Fees, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1987, at D3, col 5. In 1986,
Safeway Stores was acquired in a $4.1 billion leveraged buy out to repel a takeover,
and Macy's, which was not faced with a takeover bid, went private in a $3.7 billion
leveraged buy out. See Brooks, Safeway Agrees to Sale Valued at $4.1 Billion, L.A.
Times, July 28, 1986, pt. 1, at 4, col. 2.
97 Colt Industries recently recapitalized in a transaction that gave it total debt of
$1.42 billion and shareholders' equity of negative $1.56 billion. See Selby, Learning to
Like Leverage, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1986, at 118, 125.
91 See id. at 120.
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which was a negative $152 billion."99 As the corporate debt burden has
increased, there has been a corresponding decline in the quality of out-
standing debt.10 Economist John Kenneth Galbraith draws a parallel
to the crash of 1929:
Leverage is again working its wonders. Not in utility pyra-
mids: these in their full 1929 manifestation are forbidden by
law. And the great investment houses, to be sure, still raise
capital for new and expanding enterprises. But that is not
where the present interest and excitement lie. These lie in
the wave of corporate takeovers, mergers, and acquisitions,
and the leveraged buy-outs. And in the bank loans and bond
issues, not excluding the junk bonds, that are arranged to
finance these operations.
The common feature of all these activities is the crea-
tion of debt. In 1985 alone some $139 billion dollars' worth
of mergers and acquisitions was financed, much of it with
new borrowing. More, it would appear, was so financed last
year. Some $100 billion in admittedly perilous junk bonds
(rarely has a name been more of a warning) was issued to
more than adequately trusting investors. This debt has a first
claim on earnings; in its intractable way, it will absorb all
earnings (and claim more) at some astringent time in the
future.
That time will come. Greatly admired for the energy
and ingenuity it now and recently has displayed, this devel-
opment (the mergers and their resulting debt), to be ade-
99 Kaufman, Heavy Debt Poses Threat to Economic and Financial Stability, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 22, 1986, at 12, 12-13; see also Clark & Malabre, Debt Keeps Grow-
ing, with the Major Risk in the Private Sector, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1987, at 1, col. 1,
16, col. 1 (noting that "[in a recent three-year period, corporations raised $483.4 bil-
lion through various sorts of borrowing, but their equity financing fell $226.1 billion").
100 See Kaufman, supra note 99, at 12 (comparing the decline in the AAA market
with the increase in the junk-bond market); see also Worthy, The Coming Defaults in
Junk Bonds, FORTUNE, Mar. 16, 1987, at 26, 34 (noting that defaults on the lowest
grade junk bonds could have a domino effect (quoting Edward Yardeni, chief economist
for Prudential-Bache Securities)); Buchan, Junk Bonds: A Questionable Middle Age,
Fin. Times, June 16, 1987, § 2, at IX, col. 1 ("On a par value basis, the default rate
for junk bonds last year was 3.4 per cent, against a negligible rate for investment grade
bonds. This is the highest default rate since. . .1970."); Lowenstein, Three New Rea-
sons to Fear Junk Bonds, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1986, § 3, at 3, col. 1 (identifying
invention of zero-coupon junk bonds as evidence of declining quality). The decline in
the quality of debt has raised concerns regarding the willingness of certain financial
institutions with fiduciary obligations to policyholders, depositors, and retirees, such as
insurance companies, savings and loans, commercial banks, and pension funds, to invest
in high-yield, high-risk instruments. See Rohatyn, The Blight on Wall Street, N.Y.
REv. BOOKS, Mar. 12, 1987, at 21, 22; Lowenstein, supra, § 3, at 3, col. 1.
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quately but not unduly blunt, will eventually be regarded as
no less insane than the utility and railroad pyramiding and
the investment-trust explosion of the 1920s.1"1
His concern is widely shared. 0 2
2. Changing the Focus of Management
The advent of the highly leveraged takeover, and the defensive re-
sponses to it, have forced companies to focus on short-term profitability
rather than on capital investment, 03 or long-term planning, research,
and development.10 4 Targets that have increased leverage to ward off
101 Galbraith, The 1929 Parallel, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1987, at 62, 64-
65.
102 See Impact of Corporate Takeovers: Hearings on the Effect of Mergers on
Management Practices, Cost, Availability of Credit, and the Long-Term Viability of
American Industry Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 448 (1985) [hereinafter Impact
Hearings] (testimony of John Shad, SEC Chairman) ("[Iln a serious recession or a
period of rapidly rising interest rates, the companies that are obligated under the junk
bonds could get into financial difficulties."); id. at 577 (testimony of Preston Martin,
Vice Chairman of Federal Reserve Board of Governors) ("Because many mergers and
leveraged buyouts have involved heavy reliance on debt coupled with retirement of ex-
isting equity, the surviving firms are more vulnerable to downturns in earnings or
sharp increases in interest rates."); id. at 18-19 (testimony of Martin Lipton) ("Lever-
age produces great results on the way up, but. . . high leverage inevitably produces a
crash when the economy turns down."); J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 228 (Given the
perilously high levels of short-term debt and debt-to-equity ratios, companies are par-
ticularly vulnerable to an increase in interest rates.); Debt Worries, BANKER, Feb.
1986, at 65 (noting that Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, ex-
pressed concern about debt-financed acquisitions); Too Much Corporate Debt, BANKER,
Feb. 1986, at 3 (noting with disquiet that the current wave of mergers is accentuating
corporate debt); Brady, supra note 42, at A27, col. 3 ("[J]unk takeover financing...
dangerously threatens to destabilize America's national savings system.").
Others have taken issue with Galbraith's fear of leverage. See CORPORATE MERG-
ERS, supra note 44, at 14 (" 'Overall, the data seem to suggest that [the changing role
of junk bonds in tender offer activity has] been less dramatic than public perception
suggests.'" (quoting SEC, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, NONINVESTMENT
GRADE DEBT AS A SOURCE OF TENDER OFFER FINANCING 9-10 (June 20, 1986)));
Jonas & Berger, supra note 91, at 86 (noting that there is no general consensus on the
future economic effects of junk-bond financed takeovers); Selby, supra note 97, at 118
(discussing the beneficial consequences of debt on return on equity and corporate effi-
ciency); Taggart, Corporate Financing: Too Much Debt?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-
June 1986, 35, 35-36 (arguing that despite the fears raised by, among other trends, the
growth of junk-bond financing, the degree of financial weakening due to growing cor-
porate debt has been exaggerated).
103 See Dobrzynski, More Than Ever, It's Management for the Short Term, Bus.
WK., Nov. 24, 1986, at 92; see also Hayes & Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Eco-
nomic Decline, HARV. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1980, at 67, 68-70 (American corpora-
tions over the last 20 years have sacrificed long-term investments in R & D and new
equipment for short-term, market-driven concentration on return on investment.).
104 See Testimony of Robert E. Mercer Before Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of House Comm. on the Judiciary, New Jersey, at 6 (Nov. 18, 1986)
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raiders find that virtually all of their cash flow must be used to service
debt.1" 5 Potential targets seek to maximize short-term performance in
the hope of averting takeover bids."0 6 And in the era of junk bonds,
virtually every company is a potential target.1
0
7
In addition, the current wave of takeover activity has caused both
raider and target to expend enormous resources on inherently non-
productive activity:
We must not for a moment forget that there is nothing
economically useful in this merger activity. It doesn't pro-
duce goods, or increased efficiency. It doesn't improve the
system. If anything, it is damaging to the operation of the
system because it diverts attention from the hard tasks of
producing goods and services efficiently.'
08
(describing the adverse consequences of the drastic restructuring of Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. in response to the hostile takeover bid by Sir James Goldsmith) (author's
transcript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review); Drucker, Taming
the Corporate Takeover, Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1984, at 30, col. 3 (The wave of take-
overs "contributes to the obsession with the short term and the slighting of tomorrow in
research, product development, [and] market development.").
'05 For example, Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., which incurred $2 billion in
debt to thwart a bid by Wickes Corp., was forced to slash its research budget in half,
discharge 480 research employees, and moth-ball 14% of its productive capacity. See
Willoughby, What a Raider Hath Wrought, FORBES, Mar. 23, 1987, at 56, 56; see
also Selby, supra note 97, at 120 (In a typical deal, "more than 100 percent of the cash
flow can be committed to debt payments.").
10I See Ellsworth, supra note 24, at 172 (noting that "strategies designed to shore
up short-term returns to shareholders erode the company's international competitive-
ness"); Williams, It's Time for a Takeover Moratorium, FORTUNE, July 22, 1985, at
133, 136 ("The fear of raiders also reinforces an already troublesome emphasis on
short-term thinking in American business."); Drucker, supra note 21, at 32, col. 5
(noting the role of "the panicky fear of the raider" in pushing top management "to-
ward decisions they know to be costly . . . mistakes").
107 See J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 192 ("For practical purposes, junk bonds all
but eliminated corporate size as a takeover defense.").
108 Crichton, Galbraith on the Boesky Scandal, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1986, § 3,
at 3, col. 1; see also R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 145 (1983) (noting
that ploys such as threatened takeovers "do not enlarge the economic pie; they merely
reassign the slices"); Coffee, supra note 19, at 1221-50 (examining three types of dis-
economies that might result "from a policy aimed at maximizing the frequency of take-
overs"); Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF.
L. REV. 1582, 1586 (1983) (concluding that empirical studies are "inherently incapable
of proving . . . that mergers on average yield efficiencies"); Gordon & Kornhauser,
Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV.
761, 826 (1985) (stating that unanswered questions "undermine the evidence mar-
shaled for the view that unfriendly tender offers, by displacing entrenched inefficient
managements, increase shareholder welfare"); The Odds Against the Casino Society,
Bus. WK., Sept. 16, 1985, at 144, 144 (stating that speculation channels "far too much
talent and energy into financial shell games rather than into producing real goods and
services"); Adams & Brock, The Hidden Costs of Failed Mergers, N.Y. Times, June
21, 1987, § 3, at 3, col. 1 (detailing the expenditures on mergers, which in 1985 ex-
ceeded combined expenditures for research and development and net new investment).
[Vol. 136:1
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The huge amount of resources spent paying for the costs of merger
activity has been diverted to service industries. As a consequence,
"[e]mployment in many investment banking firms, law firms, arbitrage
firms, investment advisers, etc., has grown tenfold over the last few
years."109 As noted by former SEC Chairman Harold Williams, this
"loss in management effectiveness works against corporate and national
productivity, the wages of employees, and returns to stockholders. It
undermines our economy and our society."
1 0
3. Effect on Corporate Constituencies
The current wave of highly leveraged takeovers has threatened or
caused the flight of business operations upon which communities have
come to rely and disrupted settled relationships between the target com-
panies and employees, customers, and suppliers.11" ' Justice Powell re-
cently noted the effect of hostile takeovers on communities generally:
The corporate headquarters of the great national and mul-
tinational corporations tend to be located in the large cities of
a few States. When corporate headquarters are transferred
out of a city and State into one of these metropolitan centers,
the state and locality from which the transfer is made inevi-
tably suffer significantly. Management personnel-many of
whom have provided community leadership-may move to
the new corporate headquarters. Contributions to cultural,
charitable, and educational life-both in terms of leadership
and financial support-also tend to diminish when there is a
move of corporate headquarters." 2
But see ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 198 (1985) ("The evidence is strong
that takeovers generate aggregate net benefits to the economy."); Easterbrook & Fis-
chel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1168-74 (1981) (the prospect of a tender offer creates economic
benefits by inducing more efficient management).
109 Rohatyn, supra note 100, at 21.
110 Williams, supra note 106, at 136.
"I See Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web,
85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 72 (1986); O'Boyle & Carey, Gulfs Departing Pittsburgh
Would Deal a Harsh Blow to City's Economy and Pride, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1984, at
33, col. 3; Mintz, Community Dislocations: A Painful Side Effect of Merger, Wash.
Post, Apr. 20, 1980, at A2, col. 1.
1"2 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 n.* (1982) (Powell, J., concurring
in part); see also J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 234 (noting the potential of takeover
bids for "disruption of communities that are built around a single company"); Sheets,
supra note 20, at 51 (noting that Gulf Oil, prior to its exodus from Pittsburgh as a
consequence of Mesa Petroleum's junk-bond, bust-up bid, contributed over $2 million
in 1983 to more than 50 Pittsburgh organizations).
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Hostile takeovers have been equally harmful to more concrete con-
stituencies. As part of its restructuring to defeat a bid by Wickes Cor-
poration in late 1986, Owens-Corning was forced to cut its pretakeover
bid workforce of 28,000 by approximately 13,000.13 Sir James Gold-
smith's November 1986 bid for Goodyear affected a company that em-
ployed over 12,000 people, nearly one-eighth of Akron's workforce,
generated $500 million in employee income and $300 million in sup-
plier income, and supported three to four other local jobs for every
Goodyear job in the community." 4 Hostile takeovers clearly have trau-
matic effects on the constituencies integral to corporate existence.
4. Effect on Security Holders
The effect of hostile takeovers on security holders, the corporate
constituency most directly affected, is less clear. Although share price
studies suggest that target stockholders gain as a result of takeover ac-
tivity, there is evidence that shareholders of the raider experience a de-
cline in share values.11 5 There is also evidence that diversification by
acquisition is often detrimental. 16 Moreover, the "gain" experienced
... See O'Brien & Kline, An Rx for Jobs Lost Through Mergers, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 22, 1987, § 4, at 23, col. 2.
114 See Testimony of Thomas C. Sawyer Before Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of House Comm. on the Judiciary, New Jersey, at 2 (Nov. 18, 1986)
(author's transcript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review); see also
Prokesch, People Trauma in Mergers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1985, at Dl, col. 3, D5,
col. I ("In an effort to slash overhead by consolidating staffs and functions,. . . acquir-
ing companies . . . have discharged or pushed into early retirement tens of thousands
of people.") Similarly, Mobil Corporation's 1981 bid for Marathon Oil Company, had
it been successful, "would have spelled economic doom for the town of Findlay, OH,
population 38,000-2,500 of them employees of Marathon Oil . . . ." Takeover Tac-
tics and Public Policy: Hearings on H.R. 2371 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Tele-
communications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 381 (1984) (statement of Rep. Oxley).
115 See CHAIRMAN OF SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PRO-
TECTION, AND FINANCE OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99TH
CONG., 2D SESS., CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
ECONOMY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 31-34 (Comm. Print 1987); Dent, Unprof-
itable Mergers: Toward a Market-Based Legal Response, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 777,
778-79 (1986) ("Some studies have found, on average, slight gains from acquisitions,
but other studies have found that, on average, acquiring companies suffer losses, and
even the more optimistic studies do not deny that many acquisitions depreciate the
bidder's stock."); see also J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 233 (noting that "in almost any
heavily leveraged takeover or acquisition the target shareholders' short-term gain is,
logically and inevitably, the acquirer and target bondholders' short-term loss").
"" One study analyzed the acquisitions made by 33 major corporations and found
that more than 50% of their acquisitions in new industries, more than 60% of their
acquisitions in entirely new fields, and more than 70% of their acquisitions in unrelated
industries were ultimately divested. See Porter, From Competitive Advantage to Corpo-
rate Strategy, 65 HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1987, at 43, 44-46.
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by target shareholders may be a short-term phenomenon. According to
one study, despite the fact that the bids examined generally involved a
substantial premium over the prevailing market, a majority of targets
that defeated hostile tender offers ultimately saw their stock prices ex-
ceed the tender offer price in real terms.11
In contrast to stockholders, bondholders have been universally
harmed by the increase in corporate leverage. Whether the growth in
leverage results from a successful takeover or a successful defense, it
makes outstanding bonds riskier and, as a consequence, less valuable."'
The result is a transfer of wealth from bondholders to stockholders that
has not been, and arguably cannot be, prevented by contract or other
existing constraints." 9 Preferred stockholders are similarly disadvan-
117 See KIDDER, PEABODY & CO., SUMMARY OF DEFEATED HOSTILE TENDER
OFFERS: 1973-1984 (1984); see also Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom:
An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017, 1025-26 (1981); Lipton, Takeover
Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 132-34 (1979) [hereinafter Take-
over Bids]. A critique of the Kidder, Peabody study suggests that shareholders of
targets that defeat tender offers do not recover the equivalent of the bid premium
within two years. See Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender
Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277, 287-91 (1984); see also Coffee, supra note 19, at
1171-72 n.69 (discussing a critique of the Kidder, Peabody & Co. study that adjusts the
data for the time value of money and indicates that target shareholders would have
done better to have accepted the tender offer premium). However, a critique of the
Easterbrook & Jarrell study has in turn revealed that, if the time horizon is not artifi-
cially restricted to two years, the stock price performance of targets defeating tender
offers exceeds that of the Standard & Poor's 500 index. See D. MARGOTTA & F.
MARSTON, LONG-TERM RESULTS OF DEFEATED TENDER OFFERS (Northeastern Uni-
versity College of Business Administration Working Paper: 87-29, June 1987).
118 See J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 232-33; Farrell, Takeovers and Buyouts
Clobber Blue Chip Bondholders, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1985, at 113, 113 (noting that
27% of Moody's downgrades of corporate bonds in 1985 resulted from takeover activ-
ity); Weberman, Redmail, FORBES, Oct. 7, 1985, at 173, 173 ("What's good for CBS'
stockholders is bad for its bondholders."); Forsyth, Bad Grades: Takeovers Teach a
Costly Lesson to Bond Holders, Barron's, Feb. 24, 1986, at 24, 25-26 ("[T]he bolts
from the blue-mergers, stock buybacks and LBOs sprung on unsuspecting investors-
...have dealt the biggest blow to prices of bonds of corporations involved in these
deals."); Prokesch, Merger Wave: How Stocks and Bonds Fare, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7,
1986, at Al, col. 1 ("[S]hareholders of the surviving companies are no better off and
...bondholders on both sides are often big losers.").
I1 See McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413,
455-56 (1986) ("Contrary to popular belief, indentures do not have numerous, detailed
covenants that regulate the bondholder-stockholder conflict. . . . Such covenants are
costly. Other constraints on stockholder gain at bondholder expense are ineffective."
(footnote omitted)). One method of attempting to protect bondholders against leveraged
takeovers and buy outs is to give bondholders the power to cash in or "put" their bonds
in the event of a change in control. See Hertzberg, "Poison-Put" Bonds Are Latest
Weapon in Companies' Anti-Takeover Strategy, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1986, at 5, col. 1;
see also Clemens, Poison Debt: The New Takeover Defense, 42 Bus. LAW. 747, 749-54
(1987) (suggesting typical "poison debt" provisions that protect a company's bondhold-
ers against highly leveraged takeovers). A variant of this scheme was employed by Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. in its 1985 battle with Carl Icahn. As part of its defense, Phillips
assumed $4.5 billion in new debt, and its loan contracts prohibited future suitors from
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taged by an increase in leverage.' 20
D. Defensive Tactics
The current wave of hostile takeovers has generated a host of vig-
orous defensive tactics. These tactics, which restrict the choices of target
shareholders and may be undesirable in the abstract, are currently le-
gitimate responses to abusive takeover schemes, such as the highly
leveraged, asset-stripping takeover. One such defensive tactic, increased
leverage by the target, has already been discussed.' Other examples
follow.
1. Alteration of Voting Rights
Restricting the voting rights of large or short-term stockholders is
one method of deterring the speculative takeover bidder. A number of
companies have departed from the one-share, one-vote principle and
have restricted the voting rights of those owning more than a specified
percentage of shares.'22
Other companies have created a new class of common stock with
higher voting rights than ordinary common stock. A typical plan reclas-
sifies the common stock into two categories, Series A and B. Series A
possesses one vote per share and the right to dividends at least 10%
higher than Series B. Series A is not convertible into Series B. Series B
using Phillips' assets as security for loans without first paying off the $4.5 billion debt.
See Whitefield, Icahn Withdraws Bid for Phillips as Oil Firm Sweetens Its Own Offer,
L.A. Times, Mar. 5, 1985, pt. 4, at 1, col. 5. However, control clauses in loan agree-
ments are problematic because they tend to jeopardize the lender's creditor status, ex-
pose the lender to shareholder suits, and impede management's ability to consummate
friendly acquisitions. See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 68, at
§ 6.03[4).
120 See e.g., Norris, supra note 20, at 45, col. 1.
121 See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
122 For example, such plans have been enacted for a specified number of years by
Allegheny Corporation, Lucky Stores, Multimedia, and Premark, and without time
limitations by MCI, Figgie International, and Heights Finance. Voting restrictions of
this sort arguably violate the principle that each share of a class of stock have the same
incidents. Delaware has taken the position that discrimination among shareholders
based on the number of shares owned does not constitute unlawful discrimination
among shares. See Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 122-24 (Del.
1977); see also Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 718 (7th Cir.
1986) (holding that Indiana would follow Delaware in allowing discrimination among
shareholders), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1653 (1987). In addition, a
recent Delaware case upheld a recapitalization plan that provided for differential voting
rights based on length of ownership. See Williams v. Geier, No. 8456, slip op. at 8-9
(Del. Ch. May 20, 1987). The law in other jurisdictions is unclear. See, e.g., Asarco,
Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 478 (D.N.J. 1985) (doubting that
New Jersey would follow Providence & Worcester).
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provides ten votes per share, can be converted into Series A, and is
subject to severe restrictions on transferability."' 3
In addition, a number of states have passed "control share acquisi-
tion" statutes to deter the speculative takeover bidder.' 24 The Indiana
version was recently upheld by the Supreme Court in CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America.'25 Under the Indiana statute, the acquisi-
tion of "control shares"'2 6 in an Indiana corporation does not include
voting rights unless a majority of pre-existing disinterested shareholders
of the target agree. The Supreme Court's decision in CTS could be an
2' See Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 693, 696-99 (E.D.
Pa. 1986) (refusing to enjoin preliminarily such a revised voting scheme). Twenty-six
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") have issued or intend to
issue classes of stock with unequal voting rights. See Ingersoll, One-Share, One-Vote
Controversy Comes to Head in SEC Hearings, Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1986, at 37, col. 4;
see also Klott, A Fight over Unequal Stock, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1985, at D1, col. 3
(noting that approximately 5% of the approximately 2,200 companies listed by the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers have some form of high or low voting stock). To
prevent loss of business to other markets, the NYSE recently applied to the SEC for
permission to change its one-share, one-vote rule. After the major exchanges were una-
ble to reach agreement, the SEC proposed a rule mandating a modified one-share, one-
vote requirement for listing on a national exchange. The SEC would prohibit issuance
of new classes of stock, on or after May 15, 1987, that "have the effect of nullifying,
restricting, or disparately reducing the per share voting rights of holders of an outstand-
ing class or classes of common stock of such issuer registered pursuant to section 12 of
the [1934] Act." 52 Fed. Reg. 23,665, 23,677 (1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
240) (proposed June 24, 1987). Thus, the SEC would allow disparate voting stock
issued prior to May 15, 1987, issued when first going public, or issued as new stock
with lower voting rights than outstanding stock. The SEC would also permit the ex-
changes to exempt types of corporate actions from the rule if consistent with the policy
of the rule (for example, disparate voting stock issued as payment for an acquisition).
See id. at 23,678; see also Statement of David S. Ruder, Chairman of the SEC, Before
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce Concerning Pending Legislation Regarding Contests for Corporate Control,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (September 17, 1987) ("proposed Rule 19c-4. . .sets forth a
standard that prohibits only transactions which have the effect of disenfranchising
shareholders").
124 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 416-171 to -172 (1986); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407 (Vernon Supp.
1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.83.1 (Anderson 1985 & Page Supp. 1986);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.25(9) (West Supp. 1987); Act of July 22, 1987, ch. 3, § 2,
1987 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 32, 38-41 (West) (to be codified at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10-1211 to -1217); Act of July 21, 1987, ch. 272, 1987 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 200
(Law. Co-op.) (to be codified at MASS. GEN. L. ch. 110D, §§ 1-8, ch. 110E §§ 1-7);
Act of June 25, 1987. ch. 1, § 24, 1987 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 911, 928-35 (West) (to
be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West)).
125 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1653 (1987); see also Labaton, Business and the Law: Pre-
emption Cases Abound, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1987, at D2, col. 1 (noting that CTS is
indicative of a trend by the Court permitting states to regulate in ways that do not
directly conflict with federal goals).
121 Under the Indiana Act, an entity acquires "control shares" whenever it ac-
quires shares that, but for the Act, would bring its voting power to or above one of the
following thresholds: 20%, 33 1/3%, or 51%. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (West 1987).
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important step in discouraging the junk-bond, bust-up tender offer. In
states with control share acquisition statutes, the bidder can no longer
unilaterally obtain the voting power necessary to obtain control of the
target, effect a second-step merger, and sell the target's assets as a fi-
nancing mechanism. However, these statutes can be counterproductive
in that a raider is permitted to buy up to 20% of the target and then
demand a shareholder vote, on which a tender offer or other control
transaction can be conditioned. As raiders become accustomed to deal-
ing with these statutes, we may find that they promote rather than de-
ter takeovers.
The obvious point of schemes to restrict voting rights, whether by
charter amendment or statute, is that they help prevent raiders from
achieving speculative takeover profits at the expense of long-term
shareholders. The obvious detriment is that they increase insulation of
management from shareholder discipline and run the risk of breeding a
new generation of as yet unimagined problems. 2"
2. Poison Pills
The share purchase rights plan, dubbed the "poison pill," is a ma-
neuver specifically aimed at curbing the junk-bond, bust-up tender of-
fer.' 28 A typical rights plan contains a "flip over" provision that en-
ables rightsholders to purchase shares of an acquirer at half price in the
event a target is merged into an acquiring person.' As a consequence,
the rights plan impedes a second-step merger designed to give a raider
control of the target's assets.' The rights plan has been upheld as a
12 See Williams, supra note 106, at 136 (observing that such barriers "insulate
managers against legitimate shareholder action to depose them").
128 The author has been credited with inventing the poison pill. See J. BROOKS,
supra note 25, at 194.
129 See Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348-49 (Del. 1985) (up-
holding rights plan with such a flip over provision).
130 A number of states have enacted statutes functionally similar to the rights plan
in that they inhibit second-step mergers designed to give the raider control of the tar-
get's assets. These statutes prevent a 10% shareholder from effecting a business combi-
nation with a target for five years following the 10% acquisition unless the combination
is approved by the target's board prior to acquisition of the 10% stake. See IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-43-18 (West Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.397(3)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.459 (Vernon Supp.
1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10A-4 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 912(17)(b) (McKinney 1986); Act of Sept. 17, 1987, 1987 Wis. Act 45 (to be codi-
fied at Wis. STAT. §§ 180.725 to .726) (setting time limit at three years rather than
five); Act of Aug. 10, 1987, ch. 4, § 4, 1987 Wash. Legis. Serv. 10, 19-20 (West); Act
of July 22, 1987, ch. 3, § 2, 1987 Ariz Legis. Serv. 32, 41-44 (West) (to be codified at
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1221 to -1223); Act of June 25, 1987, ch. 1, § 25, 1987
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 911, 936-45 (West) (to be codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 302A.673).
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reasonable, initial response to "a small highly leveraged company bent
on a 'bust-up' takeover by using 'junk bond' financing to buy [the tar-
get] cheaply, sell the acquired assets to pay the debts incurred, and
retain the profit for itself."13'
The rights plan thus forces a raider to negotiate with the target's
board to determine if it desires a second-step merger, and helps to en-
sure that the raider will not abuse the tender offer process. Thus, the
rights plan is a very effective defensive mechanism in the age of abusive
takeovers.'
3. Greenmail
Under current law, a raider may secretly accumulate up to 5% of
a company and, after reaching the 5% threshold, may continue to buy
stock for ten days before any disclosure is required.' 33 The raider may
then declare an intention to seek control, put the company in play, and
set the stage for "greenmail."'" 4 The target may be willing to pay
greenmail as part of an entrenching maneuver or to protect existing
shareholders and other corporate constituencies from the consequences
of an abusive bid. For example, the target may pay greenmail to pre-
vent a raider from obtaining control of the target and arrogating to
itself the inherent worth of an undervalued target through a bust-up
takeover, a threat made real by the availability of junk-bond
financing.' 35
131 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180-81
(Del. 1986).
'3' One study concluded that the rights plan has beneficial effects. The stock
prices of 75% of the companies studied increased following the announcement of a
rights plan, and the companies studied, taken as a whole, outperformed the Standard &
Poor's 400 Index. See KIDDER, PEABODY & CO., IMPACT OF ADOPTION OF STOCK-
HOLDER RIGHTS PLANS ON STOCK PRICES 1 (1986). By contrast, based upon examina-
tion of the change in stock prices one day before and one day after announcement of the
adoption of a rights plan, a recent SEC study concludes that "poison pills are harmful
to target shareholders." OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, THE EFFECTS OF
POISON PILLS ON THE WEALTH OF TARGET SHAREHOLDERS 43 (1986). However,
even this study found no statistically significant impact on stock prices from adoption of
the "flip over" pill described above.
133 See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)
(1982).
13. Greenmail has been defined as "a targeted repurchase of securities at a pre-
mium price from an investor who holds more than 3% of the corporation's stock and
has held the stock for less than two years." Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repur-
chases and the Management-Entrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1045
n.3 (1985).
" See supra text accompanying notes 40-50; Booth, Management Buyouts,
Shareholder Welfare, and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 636,
662 (1985); Flurry of Greenmail, Bus. WK., Dec. 8, 1986, at 32-33.
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Although greenmail may be a necessary evil in some cases, it raises
a number of substantial concerns: the raider receives preferential treat-
ment not afforded other shareholders, target companies are saddled
with debt after borrowing to make the repurchase; and the possibility
of greenmail itself attracts speculative bids in the first instance."3 6
The proliferation of junk bonds increases the danger of greenmail
because easy access to financing allows almost any raider to mount a
credible threat, and the use of junk takeover bonds threatens a bust-up
of the target accompanied by a variety of negative consequences. The
current trend of highly leveraged takeover bids has led to a wave of
greenmail payments that has resulted in a public uproar.13 7 Several
bills have been introduced in Congress and state legislatures aimed at
curbing the payment of greenmail." 8
4. Self-Liquidation
One catalyst of the current takeover wave is the failure of the fi-
nancial markets to place a value on the securities of companies that is
commensurate with their underlying assets."' As a consequence, it can
be enormously profitable to leverage a bid for an undervalued com-
pany, sell the target's assets to finance the acquisition, and pocket the
"I See 133 CONG. REC. S337 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987) (statement of Sen. Metzen-
baum); see also J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 231 (noting that greenmail payments
often cause a target's stock to drop below the pre-bid market price).
1"7 Heavily criticized have been Sir James Goldsmith's $93 million profit at the
expense of Goodyear, see Hicks, supra note 95, at D1, col. 6, Revlon's $43 million
profit at the expense of Gillette, see Belkin, supra note 95, at D1, col. 6, Revlon's $40-
50 million profit at the expense of CPC, see Miller & Hall, supra note 95, at 3, col. 1,
Irwin Jacobs' $20 million payment from Enron Corp., see Enron PaysJacobs Green-
mail, Bus. WK., Nov. 3, 1986, at 36, 36, the Belzberg family's $37 million profit at the
expense of the USG Corporation, and the Haft family's undisclosed profit at the ex-
pense of Federated Department Stores, see Nash, Wall Street Bemoans a New "Green-
mail" Season, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1986, § 4, at 4, col. 3.
138 See, e.g., S. 78, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (preventing premium repurchases
from a 3% shareholder who has held his stake less than two years, unless the repur-
chase is approved by a majority vote of the shareholders or the same offer is made to all
shareholders). Several states are also considering similar or analogous legislation. See,
e.g., S. 542 § 1 (Cal. Feb. 24, 1987) (amending the Corporations Code to "prohibit a
target corporation . . . from purchasing more than 3% of its equity securities for more
than the post-disclosure market price . . . from a shareholder or beneficial owner un-
less approved by the board of directors and shareholders").
I" See Jonas & Berger, supra note 91, at 87 (noting that because the Q ratio, the
ratio of market value of assets to replacement value, is above .75 but less than 1, it
continues to be cheaper to buy old assets than to build new ones). One commentator
attributes the cause of the disparity between market and replacement costs to many
years of inflation. See Drucker, Corporate Takeovers-What Is To Be Done?, 82 PuB.
INTEREST, Winter 1986, at 3, 6 ("[Tlhe most predictable, indeed the most typical dis-
tortion of inflation is between the value of assets and their earning power.").
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profits.140 Targets have resorted to self-liquidation to raise share prices
in the short-term and preserve the resulting gain from the asset sales
for their own shareholders."' The leverage boom, therefore, has forced
companies to sell assets in order to increase the paper value of their
shares, rather than for intrinsic business reasons. 42
5. Institutional Investor Activism
One manifestation of increased activism on the part of institutional
investors has been the formation of institutional investor organizations
to oppose takeover defenses. In 1985, at the initiative of the California
State Treasurer, the Council of Institutional Investors was formed. 4
The Council adopted a "Shareholders Bill of Rights" in April 1986.
The Bill demands that shareholder approval be required for a wide
range of management actions, including issuing stock that would dilute
the voting power of existing shares by 20% or more, selling 20% or
more of corporate assets to a hostile bidder in exchange for a takeover
ceasefire, paying greenmail, or adopting a poison pill. 44 Similarly, the
California Public Employees' Retirement System has solicited proxies,
albeit unsuccessfully, from shareholders of more than a dozen compa-
nies in opposition to management proposals that might inhibit take-
overs, such as proposals to elect directors to staggered terms and pro-
posals that authorize the issuance of large amounts of common stock for
140 As noted, Pantry Pride's acquisition and bust-up of Revlon, see supra note 40,
remains the prototype. There has been recent speculation that the Haft family's at-
tempt to buy Dayton Hudson Corp., "one of the best managed companies in retailing,"
springs in large part from the fact that Dayton "has been investing heavily in new
stores that haven't yet boosted its earnings." Schwadel, Haft's Bid for Dayton Appar-
ently Aimed at Proving Family Can Run Big Retailer, Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1987, at
8, col. 1; see also J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 227 (citing a study showing that "in a
majority of cases, the acquirers themselves considered their targets already to be well
managed: that is, their objective was not to discipline or replace poorly run companies
but to own well-run ones").
141 For example, Goodyear was forced to dismantle a number of units and plants
to raise share prices in the wake of Sir James Goldsmith's bust-up bid, see Bianco,
supra note 95, at 32, and Purolator announced a self-liquidation plan to save itself
from Unicorp, see Company News: Purolator Strategy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1986, at
D5, col.6.
142 See generally SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION, AND FINANCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: PUBLIC POL-
ICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ECONOMY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 13-18, 40-48,
57-63 (Comm. Print 1986) (noting the various non-production-based forces driving the
sale and idling of assets); Rohatyn, supra note 100 (underscoring the generally non-
productive nature of these transactions).
14 See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 312 (K. Gruber 21st ed. 1987)
(describing the organization and its goals).
"I" See Castro, And Now Proxy Power: Calls for More Corporate Say, TIME,
April 21, 1986, at 62; Mathiasen & Rosenbaum, supra note 28, at 33.
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unspecified purposes.145
The California Retirement System has been joined by, among
other organizations, the College Retirement Equities Fund ("CREF"),
which controls pension assets for a nationwide group of college and
university employees, in opposing the poison pill. By early 1987, some
thirty shareholder resolutions urging companies to either refrain from
adopting any poison pill plan without shareholder approval or rescind
any such existing plan unless it is approved by stockholders were voted
on at annual shareholder meetings. 46 While these resolutions did not
receive a majority vote at any meeting, they demonstrated significant
institutional support.
1 47
Two other organizations contributed to institutional investor activ-
ism in 1986. In March 1986, the State of Wisconsin Investment Board
announced its intention to sponsor shareholder resolutions opposing
such widely divergent measures as U.S. investment in South Africa and
poison pills. 48 In August 1986, T. Boone Pickens formed the United
Shareholders Association as a pro-takeover lobbying group. During its
brief existence, Pickens' group has opposed greenmail, poison pills,
management control of the proxy machinery, and variations on the one-
share, one-vote scheme.
1 49
Opposition to defensive tactics of these sorts might be welcome in
the context of an overall regulatory scheme that also sought to curb
abusive takeover tactics. In isolation, however, such opposition must be
viewed as an attempt to maintain a high level of takeover activity in
145 See Mathiasen & Rosenbaum supra note 28, at 33.
146 See Anders, Institutional Holders Irked by "Poison Pill", Wall St. J., Mar.
10, 1987, § 1, at 6, col. 1; Lipton, A Sensible Deterrent to Takeover Mania, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 14, 1986, § 3, at 2, col. 3; Hall, U.S. Pension Fund Attacks Companies
on Poison Pill, Fin. Times, Nov. 4, 1986, § 1, at 34, col. 4.
1 7 Based on the results of approximately 20 meetings, about 20% of the outstand-
ing shares have been voted in favor of such resolutions, which have not attained a
majority vote at any meeting. See 1987 Poison Pill Rescission Proposals-What Did
It All Mean?, GEORGESON REP. 1, 2 (2d Qtr. 1987) (noting further that, "[iun no case
did a poison pill rescission proposal achieve a favorable vote in excess of 30% of the
outstanding shares"). Institutional investors have reported the average favorable vote
for the anti-pill resolutions as a percentage of votes cast (29.4%) rather than as a per-
centage of outstanding shares and have attempted to draw some solace from the fact
that the anti-pill resolutions garnered more average support than the general share-
holder-sponsored resolutions. See Anti-Poison Pill Proposals Draw Strong Shareholder
Vote, CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL., May-June 1987, at 66-71.
148 See Mathiasen & Rosenbaum, supra note 28, at 33-34 (noting that Wisconsin
officials have said they are prepared to solicit proxies in support of their proposals if
the companies do not voluntarily agree to take the actions requested).
149 See Sarasohn, Wall Street Amasses Huge Lobbying Forces, Legal Times, Apr.
13, 1987, at 1; Rep. Markey Urges Congress to Adopt Comprehensive Takeover Pack-
age, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVEs, Apr. 2, 1987, at A-6.
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order to create speculative profits for institutional investors.' 50
II. THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In 1932, Professor E. Merrick Dodd broadened the corporate gov-
ernance debate by asking which constituencies corporate managers
could legitimately claim to represent. 5 ' Against a background of mas-
sive unemployment and social unrest, Dodd argued that corporate man-
agers must serve as trustees for a wide variety of constituencies in addi-
tion to shareholders." 2 Professor Berle, who had previously expressed
concern that management inadequately represented the interests of
shareholders, 5 ' resisted Dodd's expansive concept of corporate respon-
sibility: "[Ylou can not abandon emphasis on 'the view that business
corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stock-
holders' until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and reason-
ably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else."' 54
The advent of junk-bond, bust-up takeovers, the defensive re-
sponses to such takeovers, and the dangers posed to a wide variety of
constituencies has again focused debate on the issue that divided Berle
and Dodd over fifty years ago. For whom are corporate managers
trustees?
A. Shareholders
It would seem beyond question that corporate managers must gov-
ern on behalf of shareholders by whom they are elected and to whom
the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are said to run. Even this no-
tion, however, has elicited some debate. Professor Abram Chayes has
suggested that shareholders may be the constituency least deserving of
management's protection.'55 They are able to liquidate their invest-
'50 See Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Director's Responsibili-
ties-An Update, 40 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1430 (1985) (describing the role of speculation).
1I See Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145 (1932).
"2 See id. at 1162-63.
153 See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 11, at 277.
154 Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365, 1367 (1932). It is interesting to note that 22 years later Berle conceded that
"[tihe argument has been settled . . . squarely in favor of Professor Dodd's conten-
tion." A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954). He later
noted: "[Mlodern directors are not limited to running business enterprise for maximum
profit, but are in fact and recognized in law as administrators of a community system."
Berle, Foreword to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY xii (1972) [hereinafter
THE CORPORATION].
155 See Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPO-
RATION, supra note 154, at 25, 40-41.
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ments quickly and may be viewed as having less of a permanent stake
in the enterprise than other constituencies. 56 Chayes argues that share-
holders deserve "the voiceless position in which the modern develop-
ment left them.'
1 57
As noted by Professor Williamson, however, such a view confuses
shareholders of the moment with the firm's shareholders as a perma-
nent constituency.' 58 Professor Williamson has observed:
Stockholders as a group bear a unique relation to the
firm. They are the only voluntary constituency whose rela-
tion with the corporation does not come up for periodic re-
newal. Labor, suppliers in the intermediate product market,
debt-holders, and consumers all have opportunities to rene-
gotiate terms when contracts are renewed. Stockholders, by
contrast, invest for the life of the firm and their claims are
located at the end of the queue should liquidation occur.'59
Although shareholders may be able to liquidate their investments
quickly, those who choose to invest for the long-term are surely deserv-
ing of management consideration.'
B. Legitimacy of Broader Concerns
Management, many have argued, should be concerned solely with
the maximization of shareholder wealth.' 6 1 Proponents of this view as-
1. See id. at 40.
15 Id. at 41 (footnote omitted).
158 Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 (1984) (argu-
ing instead that the board of directors is a governance structure "whose principal pur-
pose is to safeguard those who face a diffuse but significant risk of expropriation be-
cause the assets in question are numerous and ill-defined, and cannot be protected in a
well-focused, transaction-specific way" and that, consequently, "the board of directors
should be seen as a governance instrument of the stockholders").
159 Id. at 1210.
180 See Kissinger, The Word for Takeovers: Pernicious, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5,
1986, at A35, col. 2, A35, col. 4 ("[Ilt is ludicrous that the speculator. . . should have
the same moral claim and rights as an investor who has devoted his whole life to the
building of a company and who carries within him a sense of obligation to the com-
pany's long-term stockholders, its employees and the community where the company
may be the principal employer.").
181 See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th
Cir. 1986) (noting that the primary criterion for judging the legality of a poison pill
plan is "the goal of stockholder wealth maximization"), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S.
Ct. 1637 (1987); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684
(1919) ("A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholders.").
In the takeover context, proponents of this view argue that management should do
nothing to impede tender offers at premium prices. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 108, at 1164 (arguing that "legal rules allowing the target's management to
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sert that broader management concerns would lead to inefficiency 62
and promote arbitrary management decision-making,' and that non-
shareholder constituencies may adequately protect themselves through
contract.'
64
However, the shareholders-only view ignores the reality that other
constituencies both share the risk and are vital to the success of corpo-
rate activity. With respect to employees, Clyde Summers has noted:
If the corporation is conceived . . .as an operating institu-
tion combining all factors of production to conduct an on-
going business, then the employees . . are as much mem-
bers of that enterprise as the shareholders who provide the
capital. Indeed, the employees may have made a much
greater investment in the enterprise by their years of service,
engage in defensive tactics in response to a tender offer decrease shareholders' wel-
fare"); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 845 (1981) (stating that "the corpo-
rate structure requires that tender offerors have unrestricted access to target sharehold-
ers"). Professor Gilson argues that the role of arbitrageurs in the tender offer process
demonstrates that in such context the distinction between short- and long-term share-
holders is of no significance. See id. at 856 (arbitrageurs stand as "surrogates" for long-
term investors, "who have already demonstrated, by selling their shares to the arbi-
trageurs, that they perceived their 'long-term' interests were outweighed by the size of
the [tender offer] premium"). Gilson's analysis, however, confuses cause and effect.
Merely because target shareholders do sell to arbitrageurs is not proof that they believe
such action is desirable. Even target shareholders who would prefer that the target
remain independent may sell to avoid the possibility of being left with devalued minor-
ity shares in the event the tender offer succeeds. See Bebchuk, supra note 81, at 1722
(noting that "as long as the bid has some chance of success, the prospect of a takeover
will pressure the shareholder to tender his shares"). In addition, there is objective evi-
dence for the proposition that recent tender offers at substantial premiums over the
market did not capture the long-term value of the targets' stock. See supra note 117.
Therefore, the distinction between short- and long-term value remains legitimate.
162 See E. EPSTEIN, WHO OWNS THE CORPORATION? 42 (1986) (noting that
making managers the custodians of institutions would "create dislocation in supply and
demand and stagnation"); M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962) (ar-
guing that broadening the scope of management concerns is a "fundamentally subver-
sive doctrine" that could "thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free soci-
ety"); Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible?,
in THE CORPORATION, supra note 154, at 64 ("The new corporate morality may re-
sult in prices and wages which sabotage the market mechanism and systematically dis-
tort the allocation of resources. Such pricing practices would make the task of monetary
and fiscal authority in controlling general fluctuations of trade more expensive and
more difficult, and could well make it impossible to sustain high levels of employment
save at the cost of considerable price inflation.").
163 See Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and
Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REV. 248, 281 (1969).
16 See Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 140 (1986) (arguing that creditors,
for example, can sue on underlying debt contract); Williamson, supra note 158, at
1228 (arguing that labor, suppliers engaged in large, firm-specific projects, and some
customers may influence the corporation through contract).
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may have much less ability to withdraw, and may have a
greater stake in the future of the enterprise than many of the
stockholders.'
Much the same can be said for other constituencies such as customers,
suppliers, and host communities.' 66 The integral role that these constit-
uencies play requires that management be free to consider their inter-
ests.' 67 Rational shareholders with an interest in the long-term prosper-
ity of the corporation would also desire that management have this
flexibility.' 68
The availability of the contracting process, moreover, is not suffi-
cient cause to restrict the concerns of management. First, it is unclear,
as a factual matter, whether non-shareholder constituencies can ade-
quately protect themselves through contract."6 9 Second, the contracting
165 Summers, Codetermination in fhe United States: A Projection of Problems
and Potentials, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 170 (1982); see also R. DAHL,
AFTER THE REVOLUTION? 115-40 (1970) (arguing that corporate governance should
not be exclusively a shareholder concern, and that other constituencies, such as employ-
ees, have a role to play).
"s Harold Williams, a former SEC Chairman, has noted: "[A] corporation is
more than the aggregate of its tangible assets-and more than the equity of its current
shareholders-it is an institution with a complex of interpersonal and contractual rela-
tionships that create legitimate interests in the corporation among employees, suppliers,
customers, communities, and the economy at large." Williams, Speech Before the Sev-
enth Annual Securities Regulation Institute, reprinted in [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,445, 82,876 (Jan. 17, 1980); see also Brewster, The
Corporation and Economic Federalism, in THE CORPORATION, supra note 154, at
72-73 (noting that the modern corporation "governs" a constituency whose interests are
often distinguishable from those of ownership); Klein, The Modern Business Organiza-
tion: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1563 (noting ownership of
corporation is not as important as much of academia believes, and that a wide variety of
actors must be considered "participants and not appendages"); Nussbaum & Dobrzyn-
ski, supra note 19, at 103 (quoting Hicks B. Waldron, chairman of Avon Products,
Inc., who has recognized his duty to take a long-term perspective for the benefit of
"40,000 employees and 1.3 million representatives around the world . . . [and for]
suppliers, institutions, customers, [and] communities").
167 See Williams, supra note 166, 82,881; Block & Miller, The Responsibilities
and Obligations of Corporate Directors in Takeover Contests, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 44,
68 (1983).
16 See Knauss, Corporate Governance-A Moving Target, 79 MICH L. REV.
478, 498 (1981) (arguing that the directors' obligation to act for the benefit of the
corporation includes the obligation to ensure that the corporation does what society
expects); Soderquist & Vecchio, Reconciling Shareholders' Rights and Corporate Re-
sponsibility: New Guidelines for Management, 1978 DUKE L.J. 819, 840 (arguing that
shareholders expect to be treated like investors as opposed to "owners," and expect
management to consider a wide constituency when making corporate decisions); State-
ment of the Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors
of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2099 (1978) (stating
that "share owners and directors alike have an interest in assuring that entities with
which they are identified behave ethically and as good citizens").
169 See Chayes, supra note 155, at 43 (suggesting that non-labor constituencies
have not yet developed arrangements as effective as the collective bargaining process);
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process is by its nature a prospective attempt to legislate relations be-
tween a corporation and a constituency. As such, it is best confined to
the intrinsic elements of a given relationship.1"' Corporations and em-
ployees, for example, should be able to come to terms over wages,
hours, and tasks, but will have difficulty agreeing on the manner in
which a target's board should respond to a future takeover bid whose
form is as yet unknown.' Some takeover bids will affect employee
interests the most; others will have greater impact on different constitu-
encies. Management must be free in each case to respond to the threats
posed by particular bids. Finally, the possibility that management will
seize on its greater flexibility to act in its self-interest is best addressed
generally through mechanisms that impose discipline on management.
Such mechanisms are discussed in Parts III and IV of this Article.
C. Legal Legitimacy
Courts have recognized that constituencies other than shareholders
are proper objects of management concern.'7 2 In Herald Co. v.
Seawell,'73 the Tenth Circuit upheld the Denver Post's defensive ma-
neuvers against a bid by a newspaper publisher with a history of labor
difficulties. The court noted the legitimacy of the Post's concern for
non-shareholder constituencies:
A corporation publishing a newspaper. . . has other obliga-
tions besides the making of a profit. It has an obligation to
the public, that is, the thousands of people who buy the pa-
per, read it, and rely on its contents.
McDaniel, supra note 119, at 455-56 (noting that bondholders have not been able to
protect themselves by contract).
170 See Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1499
(1959) (noting that it is not possible to reduce all rules necessary to govern a company
down to a written contract); Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L.
& ECON. 395, 401 (1983) (stating that it is inefficient to detail every element of a
relationship by contract).
17-1 See Summers, supra note 165, at 164-65 (commenting that collective bargain-
ing typically covers wages, hours, and working conditions, but not corporate decisions
such as whether to merge with another company); Comment, Broadening the Board:
Labor Participation in Corporate Governance, 34 Sw. L.J. 963, 977 (1980) (noting
that the bargaining process is "directed to the end of fixing the parties' rights and
obligations" and as such "prevents adaptation to unforeseen problems").
172 See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 1984)
(stating that board must have wide latitude to protect the interests of shareholders,
employees and management when considering a takeover bid); Enterra Corp. v. SGS
Assoc., 600 F. Supp. 678, 687 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (noting management might properly
consider the interests of suppliers, customers, lenders, and the stability of the company
when considering a takeover bid).
173 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972).
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. . . Such a newspaper corporation, not unlike some
other corporations, also has an obligation to those people
who make its daily publication possible.'74
Judge Pollack of the Southern District of New York recently up-
held defensive measures taken to thwart GAF's junk bond, bust-up bid
for Union Carbide:
A corporation with a perceived threat of dismember-
ment of large divisions of the enterprise, employing
thousands of employees, owes substantial regard for their
pension benefits, and in the case of loyal management, sever-
ance benefits. These legitimate concerns for their past con-
duct of the enterprise and its requirements need not be left to
the goodwill of an unfriendly acquiror of corporate control
in the jungle warfare involving attempted takeovers. The ex-
ercise of independent, honest business judgment is the tradi-
tional and appropriate way to deal fairly and even-handedly
with both the protection of investors, on the one hand, and
the legitimate concerns and interests of employees and man-
agement of a corporation who service the interests of inves-
tors, on the other.'
75
Similarly, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,17 6 the Delaware
Supreme Court upheld a target's self-tender that excluded a raider
from participation. The court noted that, in taking such action, the tar-
get's board was authorized to consider "the impact [of a takeover bid]
on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers,
employees, and perhaps even the community generally)."' 7
There is, however, no consensus among the courts regarding the
legitimacy of directors' concern for broader constituencies. Only one
year after the Unocal decision, the Delaware Supreme Court held in
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 78 that a tar-
get's board may not consider the interests of the corporation's notehold-
ers once a decision has been made to sell the company. 17 At that point,
174 Herald, 472 F.2d at 1094-95; see also Takeover Bids, supra note 117, at 106
(supporting efforts to "further the interests of the community, employees, the environ-
ment, consumers, and perceived national policy at the expense of maximum profits and
maximum benefits to shareholders").
17' GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
176 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
177 Id. at 955.
178 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
171 Id. at 182 (noting that "concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate
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the court stated, the target's board is restricted to conducting a fair and
open auction for the exclusive benefit of the shareholders.1 80 Although
Revlon should not restrict the capacity of a target's board to act for
broader constituencies when the target is not yet for sale, Revlon does
make the scope of the Unocal concern for nonshareholder constituencies
less certain.
In Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp.,'"' moreover, the
Seventh Circuit refused to sanction a poison pill rights plan designed to
protect the target and its several constituencies against a junk-bond,
bust-up tender offer. The court's sole criterion for assessing director
behavior in adopting the plan was whether the plan advanced "the goal
of stockholder wealth maximization."'
8 2
State legislatures have responded to the uncertainty created by the
courts by enacting statutes that designate the constituencies that direc-
tors may legitimately represent. Ohio, 8' Pennsylvania,"8 Maine,"85
and Minnesota'86 have codified management's right to consider gener-
ally the interests of employees, suppliers, customers, and other commu-
nity interests. Missouri has passed legislation authorizing consideration
of such interests in responding to a takeover bid.'8 7 In addition, several
corporations have adopted charter provisions specifying management's
right to consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies.' 88
Conflicting case law and the scarcity of legislation in this area
have clouded the legal status of nonshareholder constituencies with a
stake in the enterprise and the rights and responsibilities of directors in
addressing the interests of these constituencies. The judicial and legisla-
tive attempts to expand management responsibilities in the age of fi-
nance corporatism, however, have generally been ad hoc attempts to
deal with symptoms of what is a much larger, more complex problem.
when an auction among active bidders is in progress"); accord Edelman v. Fruehauf
Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886-87 (6th Cir. 1986); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acqui-
sition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 278 (2d Cir. 1986).
180 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
181 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637
(1987).
182 Id. at 256.
181 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
184 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363(B) (Purdon Supp. 1987).
185 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (Supp. 1986).
188 See 1987 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 190 (West) (to be codified at MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.251 (West)).
187 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
188 For example, Control Data Corp. and McDonald's have recently amended
their charters in this fashion. See Form SE, Control Data Corp., Exhibit 3, Certificate
of Incorporation (April 23, 1986); Form 10-K, McDonald's Corporation, Exhibit 3,
Restated Certificate of Incorporation (June 16, 1986).
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Not only must any attempt to reform contemporary corporate govern-
ance address the global problems created by institutional investor con-
trol, highly leveraged takeovers, and defensive responses to such take-
overs; it must also clarify the expanded responsibility of management.
D. Social Concerns
An attempt could be made to expand this Article's suggestion that
corporate managers consider the welfare of certain nonshareholder con-
stituencies. In support, one could cite the considerable literature that is
devoted to the proposition that corporations have a duty to society to be
"good citizens" and act "responsibly." 89 This view originated from a
concern that corporations were taking such actions as polluting the en-
vironment, producing unsafe products, and resorting to bribery to max-
imize profit. The law has varied on whether general social, moral, and
political questions are proper concerns of corporate governance.190
This approach, however, is fundamentally misconceived. Ex-
panding corporate governance to encompass society as a whole benefits
neither corporations nor society. Because management is ill-equipped to
deal with questions of general public interest, that is, issues broader in
scope than those issues directly affecting the corporation and its constit-
uencies, the corporation would only be harmed by the inevitable ineffi-
189 See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT COR-
PORATION 125 (1976) [hereinafter TAMING THE GIANT] (identifying a corporate man-
ager's duty to balance the overall health of the organization against the relevant social
concerns when making corporate decisions); C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 116
(1975) (advocating corporate "responsibility of a 'mature' sort, emphasizing cognitive
processes rather than blind rule obedience"); D. VOGEL, LOBBYING THE CORPORA-
TION 6 (1978) (noting that a corporation wields the power of the government and
therefore must be treated like a government, and held accountable to society at large);
Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crises, 50 B.U.L. REV. 157, 164
(1970) (claiming that a corporation derives its sustenance from the community and
therefore has a moral obligation to that community); Schwartz, Towards New Corpo-
rate Goals: Co-Existence with Society, 60 GEo. L.J. 57, 104 (1971) (stating that a
corporation must shape its conduct to be consistent with society's goals); Weiss, Social
Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance System to Re-
solve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA L. REV. 343, 345 (1981) (noting a manager
must find a reasonable balance between maximizing corporate profits and lessening
undesirable social effects).
190 Compare Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 678-82
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (suggesting that anti-napalm resolution was a proper subject of proxy
solicitation), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) with State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Hon-
eywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 329, 191 N.W.2d 406, 411 (1971) (denying inspection of
corporate records because desire to stop manufacture of arms for Vietnam war was not
a proper corporate purpose). Subsequent to the Medical Committee case, the SEC
amended Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-8 (1986), to confirm a shareholder's right to
address general social issues through the proxy mechanism. See Exchange Act Release
No. 34-12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994 (1976).
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ciency that such an expansion would engender."' 1 Encouraging corpo-
rations, a powerful group not directly accountable to or representative
of our society, to take positions on the controversial social, moral, and
political issues of the day also has dangerous anti-democratic implica-
tions.19 2 The proper forum for the consideration of such issues is the
legislature. If society is concerned that corporations are misbehaving on
general social matters, such as the environment, the correct response is
regulation, not an expanded notion of corporate governance.
The proper scope of corporate governance, therefore, encompasses
all constituencies that are integral to the conduct of the enterprise and
no others. These are the groups that shareholders, qua shareholders,
would also desire their managers to represent.9 3 It remains to consider
methods to ensure that corporate managers will act in this manner,
rather than in their own self-interest or according to some misguided
notion of corporate responsibility.
III. CRITIQUE OF VARIOUS PROPOSALS
A. Interest Group Representation
The most direct method of ensuring that corporate management
adequately represents all its constituencies is to grant these constituen-
191 By contrast, because employees and communities are integral to the conduct of
the enterprise, making contributions and establishing programs for the benefit of em-
ployees and communities in which the corporation operates constitute legitimate corpo-
rate purposes. See, e.g., American Rolling Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.2d 314, 315
(6th Cir. 1930) (finding that a corporate contribution to a civic fund was in pursuit of
legitimate corporate interests); Armstrong Cork Co. v. H.A. Meldrum Co., 285 F. 58,
58 (W.D.N.Y. 1922) (holding that corporate contributions to educational institutions
are legitimate corporate expenditures). See generally Blumberg, supra note 189, at
166-92 (presenting a number of legal justifications for an expanded notion of corporate
responsibility to its employees and community).
192 See M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 162, at 196-202 (concluding that if corpora-
tions attempt to make determinations by considering social factors, this will undermine
the free market system and the democratic foundation of our society).
193 Rational shareholders would view management's representation of broader
constituencies as conducive to profit-maximization in the long-term. A corporation's
relationships with its employees, customers, and suppliers, for example, are heavily
dependent on its ability to foster good will with these groups. To the extent a corpora-
tion has the confidence of such groups, it will generate higher productivity from its
employees, a steady stream of business from its customers, and a stable source of mater-
ials from its suppliers. Over the long-term, good will should translate into dollars. The
courts have recognized the symbiotic relationship between shareholders and broader
corporate constituencies in upholding measures designed to advance the interests of such
constituencies. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1020
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that a corporation's board may respond to "the legitimate
concerns and interests of employees and management . . . who service the interests of
investors"). See also supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
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cies seats on the board of directors."' The most developed argument
along these lines calls for employee codetermination, 195 usually in ac-
cordance with the German model. 9
Although this approach has the value of affirming that corpora-
tions have duties to nonshareholder constituencies, its drawbacks far
outweigh its benefits. Interest group representation may not guarantee
194 One commentator suggests that the principal purpose of the board of directors
is to "safeguard those who face a diffuse but significant risk of expropriation because
the assets in question are numerous and ill-defined, and cannot be protected in a well-
focused, transaction-specific way." Williamson, supra note 158, at 1210. He states that
those constituencies least able to protect themselves by contract should be represented
on the board of directors. Shareholders are the least able to protect themselves in this
manner, but other groups who have contacts with the corporation may occasionally
qualify for such representation. Id. at 1210, 1228. For example, labor may qualify for
board representation when give-backs are requested by management, and suppliers and
large customers may deserve board seats when engaged in major firm-specific projects.
See id. at 1228; see also Dahl, Power to the Workers?, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Nov. 19,
1970, at 20, 23 ("[O]thers whose interests would be affected by the decisions of an
enterprise might be given the right to participate in decisions . . . through representa-
tives on the board of directors of the firm.").
... See Dahl, supra note 194, at 20; Summers, supra note 165, at 183-86. More-
over, as noted above, corporate governance is a dynamic process. In recent years, em-
ployee ownership has emerged as a significant and rapidly growing factor in corporate
ownership. See Hoerr, "We're Not Going to Sit Around and Allow Management to
Louse Things Up," Bus. WK., May 18, 1987, at 107, 107 ("[E]mployees own at least
20% of nearly 30 publicly traded companies with more than 1,000 workers."). For
example, in the wake of a hostile bid -by its pilots association, Allegis Corp. offered
employees of its United Airlines unit an ownership interest in the company to quell
labor difficulties. See Valente, Allegis Weighs Greater Role for Employees, Wall St. J.,
May 1, 1987, at 6, col. 1. The pilots' union has continued to pursue its $4.5 billion
cash and note offer for United. Allegis' board has opposed the pilots' initiative, fearing
that it would lead to "a heavily indebted, financially weak airline with severely limited
growth potential;" it has, however, expressed willingness to consider any offer that
"was for all cash and left the company adequately financed." Dallos, Airline's Parent
Softens Stance: Allegis Sets Preconditions for Sale of United, L.A. Times, Aug. 15,
1987, § 4, at 1, col. 2.; see also J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 203 (noting "the sudden
and dramatic appearance of labor as a player in the takeover game"). Also prevalent is
the growing power of employee stock ownership plans. See Hoerr, supra, at 107 ("The
growing number of companies wholly or partially owned by Employee Stock Owner-
ship Plans (ESOPs) is also increasing the voice of labor-union and nonunion-at all
levels of the corporation."). I believe that these trends will continue and that, in the
twenty-first century, employee ownership will replace institutional ownership as the
dominant concern of corporate governance. Cf Clark, supra note 1, at 565-67 (herald-
ing a fourth stage of capitalism based, in part, on the proliferation of employee benefit
plans).
18 See Bonanno, Employee Co-Determination: Origins in Germany, Present
Practice in Europe, and Applicability to the United States, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
947, 949 (1977) ("Any discussion of employee participation in management at the
board level must start with the German system of worker codetermination. . . ."). Ac-
cording to the German model, a supervisory board is elected by shareholders and em-
ployees. The supervisory board exercises a broad oversight function and elects the man-
aging board, which supervises the corporation's daily operations. See id. at 952-58;
Schoenbaum & Lieser, Reform of the Structure of the American Corporation: The
"Two-Tier" Board Model, 62 Ky. L.J. 91, 96-102 (1973).
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influence to the affected groups. To the degree that policy-making is
performed at the management rather than the board level, board repre-
sentation can have only limited impact.' 97 Given that interest groups
would generally have a minority number of board seats, representation
would serve more to achieve a complete airing of views than to redis-
tribute influence. 9 Moreover, labor unions have generally opposed
board representation, fearing the possibility of co-option. 99
Interest group representation also raises troublesome questions
concerning the structure and purpose of the board of directors. It would
transform the board from a directory body concerned with the good of
the whole to a quasi-legislature functioning in pluralist fashion.200 Such
a system would necessarily give interest groups sway over a wide vari-
ety of issues with at most marginal effect on these groups and which, as
a consequence, cannot be proper objects of their concern. Finally, mir-
roring the unions' fear of co-option, such a system would result in con-
flicts of interest for board members, who would be required to strike a
balance between their parochial interests and the good of the corpora-
tion.201 Consequently, some other method must be found to ensure
1917 See Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corpo-
ration: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375, 377 (1975) ("In
the large, publicly-held corporation, policymaking, like management, is an executive
function."); Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L.
REV. 293, 295 (1979) ("Boards of directors of most large- and medium-sized companies
[do] not establish objectives, strategies, and policies." These "roles [are] performed by
management."); Summers, supra note 165, at 173-74.
199 See Summers, supra note 165, at 183-84.
199 See generally P. BRANNEN, E. BATSTONE, D. FATCHETT & P. WHITE, THE
WORKER DIRECTORS: A SOCIOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION 241 (1976) (acknowledging
that "the independence of the trade unions is a crucial condition for their oppositional
role and that involvement with participative structures may compromise this"); M.
POOLE, WORKERS' PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRY 119 (1975) ("[O]nly a rather narrow
band of participation or control programmes has attracted the unreserved enthusiasm of
officers . . . largely on the grounds that these serve to duplicate channels of workers'
representation and in consequence weaken workers' inclinations to join trade unions
and to overcome problems by means of union procedural systems."); Ellenberger, The
Realities of Co-Determination, AFL-CIO AM. FEDERATIONIST, Oct. 1977, at 10, 15
("[The American worker] is smart enough to know, in his bones, that salvation lies
-not in the reshuffling of chairs in the board room or in the executive suite-but in
the growing strength and bargaining power of his own autonomous organizations."
(quoting Lane Kirkland, AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer)).
200 Cf Dahl, supra note 194, at 23 ("[Interest group representation] would con-
vert the firm into a system of rather remote delegated authority.").
201 See TAMING THE GIANT, supra note 189, at 124 ("[T]here is the danger that
consumer or community or minority or franchisee representatives would become only
special pleaders for their constituents and otherwise lack the loyalty or interest to direct
generally."). One commentator has stated:
Such a system would harm many constituencies and only help a powerful
few. For a management team to stay in place it must satisfy its board of
directors, so instead of pursuing a neutral goal as under the present system
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proper managerial conduct in light of the constituencies to which corpo-
rations have duties.
B. Federal Incorporation
The federal chartering of major corporations has been suggested as
a way of ensuring corporate responsiveness to all corporate constituen-
cies.20 2 However, this proposal raises substantial federalism concerns.
203
The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that regulation of internal
corporate affairs is properly left to the states.20 4
In addition, allowing different state approaches creates a com-
merce in corporate charters. The states that provide a more efficient
form of corporate governance will be more successful in attracting busi-
ness. 205 Despite charges that such a system creates a "race to the bot-
tom, ' '  one study concludes that multi-state incorporation has
of profit maximization, management would have to fulfill the objectives of
those powerful interest groups with the most control over the board. Thus,
instead of a large amorphous group of shareholders benefitting from a
corporate decision only a particular powerful group of constituents would
benefit.
R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 50-51 (1978).
202 See, e.g., TAMING THE GIANT, supra note 189, at 62-71; Note, Federal Char-
tering of Corporations: A Proposal, 61 GEo. L. J. 89 (1972); see also Cary, supra
note 5 (advocating federal standards of corporate responsibility).
203 See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) ("[Ilt is state law which is the
font of corporate directors' powers."); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479
(1977) ("Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize
the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securi-
ties, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be over-
ridden."); Congregation of the Passion v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 800 F.2d 177, 181
(2d Cir. 1986) ("Such an extension of Federal regulation . . . 'would overlap and
possibly interfere' with traditional state common law governance of such fiduciary rela-
tionships." (quoting Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 479).
204 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
210 See R. WINTER, supra note 201, at 7-11; Baysinger & Butler, Race for the
Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The ALI Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J.
CORP. L. 431, 456 (1985); Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters:
"Unhealthy Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259, 282 (1980);
Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in
Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 923 (1982). Fischel argued:
If a particular form of firm organization were more efficient, or if the
law of one state were more conducive to maximizing shareholders' welfare
than the law of Delaware, founders of corporations would have every in-
centive to make the structural change or move the state of incorporation
voluntarily. That these changes have not been made voluntarily is perhaps
the most persuasive argument against federal regulation of corporations.
Id.
206 See, e.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558-59 (1933) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) ("Companies were early formed to provide charters for corporations in
states where the cost was lowest and the laws least restrictive. The states joined in
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achieved its goal of maximizing shareholder wealth.2"' Firms reincor-
porating in Delaware, the jurisdiction generally believed to allow man-
agement the greatest flexibility, were found to earn abnormal positive
returns of 30.25% over the twenty-five month period preceding and in-
cluding the month of the change.20 ' The study found no evidence of any
negative market reaction either before or after re-incorporation. 0 9
This is not to suggest that the federal government has no role to
play in improving corporate governance. As argued in Part IV, it is
entirely proper for Congress to enact takeover, tax, and proxy legisla-
tion, areas generally reserved to the federal government, to improve
corporate governance. It is equally proper for Congress to regulate in
areas of general societal concern. The impropriety lies in arrogating to
Congress control over all aspects of internal corporate life.
C. ALI's Corporate Governance Project
In 1978, the American Law Institute ("ALI") embarked on a cor-
porate governance project. Its seven tentative drafts to date have engen-
dered much opposition.21° Originally styled a "Restatement" of the law
of corporate governance, the ALI's views now appear as "analyses and
recommendations" to indicate that the ALI has done more than merely
codify existing law.211
advertising their wares. The race was one not of diligence but of laxity."). The current
validity of the "race to the bottom" theory, which posits competition among states to
decrease the restrictions on managerial behavior, is weakened in light of recent deci-
sions based on state law invalidating defensive tactics that were not shown to be reason-
ably related to the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. See Edelman v.
Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1986); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM
Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 281-83 (2d Cir. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986); AC Acquisition Corp. v. Ander-
son Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 114 (Del. Ch. 1986).
207 See Dodd & Leftwich, supra note 205, at 259.
208 See id. at 275.
209 See id. at 281-82.
210 See, e.g., NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN ANALYSIS AND CRI-
TIQUE (Mink ed. 1987) [hereinafter ANALYSIS] (compilation of essays criticizing the
ALI's tentative drafts); THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS" (Feb. 1983) [hereinafter STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE] (criti-
cizing the ALI's Tentative Draft No. 1).
21 Compare ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE:
RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS viii (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter
TENT. DRAFT No. 1] ("[A] restatement with recommendations regarding the legal du-
ties incident to corporate management and control.") with ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS vii-viii (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1984) [hereinafter TENT. DRAFT No. 2] ("The change was made to allay the fear that
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Early drafts of the ALI's corporate governance project were criti-
cized for taking a regulatory, interventionist approach to corporate gov-
ernance. 212 To bridge the gap between ownership and control first
identified by Berle and Means,2" 3 the ALl sought to increase the du-
ties, and exposure to liability, of directors.2"" The ALI's approach
threatened to decrease managerial flexibility, reduce corporate risk-tak-
ing, and increase the difficulty of recruiting talented directors. 2 5 As a
consequence of such criticism, subsequent ALI drafts have reflected a
more balanced position. An analysis of the ALI's current positions
follows.
1. Corporate Goals
The ALI has chosen to codify the proper objects of corporate be-
havior: "A business corporation should have as its objective the conduct
of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and
shareholder gain. .. ."216 The ALI recognizes exceptions for con-
forming the corporation's conduct to the law, taking account of ethical
considerations regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of
business, and devoting resources to charitable or philanthropic
purposes.
21 7
The Business Roundtable has criticized this statement of goals as
unnecessarily codifying the law at a time when the scope of a corpora-
courts might be misled by the traditional word "Restatement" in the title to view the
entire document as purporting to restate existing law.").
212 See, e.g., STATEMENT OF THE BUSINEss ROUNDTABLE, supra note 210, at 4.
211 See Wolfson, The Theoretical and Empirical Failings of the American Law
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, in ANALYSIS, supra note 210, at 69.
214 See id. at 93; Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 1259, 1286-87 (1982).
215 See Phelan, Concerns of the New York Stock Exchange, in ANALYSIS, supra
note 210, at 3 (quoting a letter from the New York Stock Exchange to the ALI expres-
sing concerns about Tentative Draft No. 1); STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESs ROUND-
TABLE, supra note 210, at 6.
21I TENT. DRAFT No. 2, supra note 211, § 2.01. The provision reads, in perti-
nent part:
A business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain,
except that, whether or not corporate profit and shareholder gain are
thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its business
(a) is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within
the boundaries set by law,
(b) may take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably
regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business, and
(c) may devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare,
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.
21 See id.
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tion's duties is becoming increasingly uncertain.2"8 However, the ALI's
statement does not exclude entirely consideration of nonshareholder
constituencies such as employees, customers, suppliers, and host com-
munities. It merely requires that business be conducted "with a view"
to enhancing shareholder profit, a worthwhile goal by any standard.
Moreover, so long as the statement is not limited to short-term share-
holder gain, an issue still being debated within the ALI, there would
seem to be no restriction on consideration of constituencies who are in-
tegral to the conduct of the enterprise, and without whom no share-
holder gain would be possible.219
2. The Accountability of Management
The ALI's approach continues to reflect some distrust of corporate
managers.220 The ALI seeks to fashion the board into a vehicle for en-
suring the accountability of management by influencing the structure of
the board. The ALI recommends, inter alia, that every large publicly
held corporation221 have a majority of outside directors222 and an audit
committee consisting entirely of outside directors.
223
This recommendation may be unwarranted.22 Although a major-
ity of outside directors is often thought desirable to take advantage of
certain enhanced presumptions of good faith in the conflict or takeover
context,22 and although the New York Stock Exchange requires listed
218 See Comments of the Business Roundtable Concerning the American Law In-
stitute's Corporate Governance Project 14-15 (May 4, 1984) (unpublished memoran-
dum) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
21 9 See Perkins, The ALI Corporate Governance Project in Midstream, 41 Bus.
LAw. 1195, 1200-01 (1986); Schwartz, Objective and Conduct of the Corporation, 52
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 511, 527 (1984).
220 See Hoog, Tinkering with Successive Drafts Will Not Change the Reporters'
Philosophy, in ANALYSIS, supra note 210, at 28 (ALI views management as running
corporations in an "arbitrary and capricious" manner).
221 A large publicly held corporation is defined to be a publicly held corporation
with 2,000 or more shareholders and at least $100 million in total assets. See TENT.
DRAFT No. 2, supra note 211, § 1.16.
222 See id. § 3.04.
223 See id. § 3.03.
224 Corporations currently have the autonomy to structure their own boards;
board structure is not dictated by judicial decisions, state law, or federal law. See TENT.
DRAFT No. 1, supra note 211, § 3.03 comment a; Karmel, The Independent Corpo-
rate Board: A Means to What End?, 52 GEO. WASH. L.REv. 534, 548 (1984). How-
ever, some states require directors who have an interest in a transaction to abstain from
being present or participating in the meeting of the board approving the transaction.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-8
(West 1969 & Supp. 1987); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1986).
225 See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir.) ("The
presumption of good faith the business judgment rule affords is heightened when the
majority of the board consists of independent outside directors."), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
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companies to have two outside directors on their boards and an audit
committee consisting entirely of outside directors,228 corporations are
now free to structure their boards as they wish. Current law provides
needed flexibility.22 7 Rules of moral suasion may alter the judicial per-
spective on boards with a majority of management directors, and make
it more difficult to gain judicial approval of actions taken by such
boards, despite the ALI's explicit disclaimer that these principles are
purely hortatory.228
3. Duty of Care
The ALl restates the director's duty of care in language that
closely approximates the common law version of the standard: "A di-
rector . . has a duty . . . to perform his functions . . . with the care
that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to ex-
ercise in a like position and under similar circumstances. "229 Neverthe-
less, commentators have criticized the ALl for employing an ordinary
negligence standard.2 0 These commentators suggest that a review of
the cases demonstrates that directors are never liable, absent special cir-
1092 (1981); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986) ("[Tlhe presence of 10
outside directors on the Texaco board, coupled with the advice rendered by the invest-
ment banker and legal counsel, constitute a prima facie showing of good faith and
reasonable investigation."); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del.
1985) (proof of good faith is enhanced when a majority of the board favoring the pro-
posal are outside directors).
22 See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL $ 303.00 (1986). The SEC has recently approved a proposal from
the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") to adopt rules for the
NASDAQ listing, effective February 1, 1989, requiring two independent board mem-
bers and a majority of independent audit committee members. See NASD, NOTICE TO
MEMBERS 87-46, 3 (1987).
227 See Seibert, The Dynamics of Corporate Governance, in ANALYSIS, supra note
210, at 19. The current flexibility may be used to advantage by a corporation with
diverse divisions and subsidiaries that may prefer to expand the number of inside direc-
tors to allow the total board's in-depth experience to match the company's diverse busi-
ness. See id.
228 See TENT. DRAFT No. 2, supra note 211, at pt. III (introductory note).
229 ALl, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS § 4.01(a) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985) [hereinafter TENT. DRAFT No. 4]. In-
deed, the ALI consciously chose to employ the "under similar circumstances test"
rather than the somewhat stricter "personal business affairs" test. See Selheimer v.
Manganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563, 573-76, 224 A.2d 634, 640-42 (1966) (statutory re-
quirement to exhibit care "which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar
circumstances in their personal business affairs" imposes a higher duty of care than the
"similar circumstances" standard).
220 See e.g., Carney, The Monitoring Board, Duties of Care, and the Business
Judgement Rule, in ANALYSIS, supra note 210, at 120-24 (articulating a series of cases
where courts have applied an ordinary negligence standard only in the special case of
banks and financial institutions).
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cumstances, unless they exhibit gross negligence and that recent cases
now have explicitly recognized this gross negligence standard.
231
Regrettably, it appears that the ALI has correctly stated the law
and that the converse is in fact true: cases purporting to apply a gross
negligence standard apply, at most, an ordinary negligence standard.
For example, in Smith v. Van Gorkom,232 the Delaware Supreme
Court purported to apply a gross negligence test.233 Nevertheless, the
court held the directors of Trans Union liable for approving a cash-out
merger despite the following facts: the merger price represented a $17
premium over the previously prevailing market price; no superior offer
was made; the company's chief financial officer opined that the merger
price was fair; and the company's outside counsel recommended the
merger.
2 3 4
As a consequence, as Part IV will argue, the difficulty with the
ALI's approach to the duty of care lies precisely in continued recogni-
tion of the common .law action for ordinary negligence rather than in
any distortion of the law.
231 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (under the busi-
ness judgement rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence);
Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corpo-
rate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1101 (1968) (directors of industrial
corporations do not run a substantial risk of liability for ordinary negligence); Hinsey,
Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project:
The Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 609, 613-15 (1984)
(courts have applied the duty of care to the oversight function only where liability
rested on neglect "that bordered on abdication"); Pease, Aronson v. Lewis: When De-
mand Is Excused and Delaware's Business Judgment Rule, 9 DEL J. CORP. LAw 39,
74-76 (1984) (under Delaware law, director liability is predicated on "gross negli-
gence"); Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance: A Critique of Part IV, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 653, 662-64 (1984) (directors or officers found to violate duty of care
only when "egregious facts" were present); see also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 891
(2d Cir. 1982) (director's decision will stand absent a demonstration of self-interest or
bad faith), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); DePinto v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 374
F.2d 37, 43-44 (9th Cir.) (court applied simple negligence phraseology to describe di-
rector conduct that included disregard of substantial complaints about management,
total unawareness about financial affairs, and failure to advocate the best interests of
the company), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1967).
... 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
"I See id. at 873. Indeed, it has been suggested that Van Gorkom might well have
a different result under the ALI's approach to the duty of care. See Perkins, supra note
219, at 1215-17. It also has been suggested that Van Gorkom began a trend away from
the traditional strict standard for director liability and toward an ordinary negligence
standard. See King, Director Protection Under Virginia Law, 20 REV. SEC. & COM-
MODITIES REG. 129, 130 (1987).
"" See 488 A.2d at 865-70. Although Van Gorkom can be explained in part by
the board's failure to obtain an investment banker's opinion on the fairness of the
merger, in Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1986), the Second Circuit found a breach of the duty of care for granting an asset lock-
up option despite the fact that the directors relied on the advice of their outside counsel
and financial advisor. Id. at 275.
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4. Duty of Loyalty
The ALI has overstated somewhat the duty of loyalty element of
the business judgment rule:
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in
good faith fulfills his duty under this Section if:
(1) he is not interested . . . in the subject of his busi-
ness judgment;
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is
in the best interests of the corporation.235
Although the ALI purports to be codifying existing law, its test
may alter the traditional business judgment rule. According to the rule,
directors' decisions are presumed to be based on sound business judg-
ment, a presumption that can be rebutted only by a showing of fraud,
bad faith, or gross overreaching.2" 6 The ALI would eliminate this ele-
ment of presumption.
237
5. Derivative Actions
In addition, the ALI would, as a general matter, liberalize the
procedures and remedies available to shareholders seeking to challenge
board conduct through derivative actions. Although the common law
provided no means of calling corporate managers to account, the deriva-
tive action was born in the nineteenth century as an equitable remedy
for this purpose.238 It is well established that the derivative action
presents great potential for abuse.23 9 In such an action, a plaintiff
235 TENT. DRAFT No. 4, supra note 229, § 4.01(c).
238 See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d
Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980);
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
999 (1981); Warshaw v. Calhown, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 157, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del.
1966); Gimbel v. Signel Co., 316 A.2d 599, 608-09 (Del. Ch.) affd, 316 A.2d 619
(Del. 1974).
211 See TENT DRAFT No. 4, supra note 229, § 4.01(a) comment (d). Indeed, a
motion to add express language of presumption was debated by the ALI and rejected
by a wide margin. See Perkins, supra note 219, at 1214.
28 Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32
N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 980-82 (1957).
239 See, e.g., Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evalua-
tion and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 261-62 (1981)
(state legislatures adapted statutes as early as the 1940s to curb abuses from frivolous
strike suit litigation; more recently judicial activity has been directed at curbing abuses,
where legislative action has failed).
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shareholder, with usually a nominal ownership interest, purports to act
for the corporation, a function generally reserved to the board of direc-
tors. The real party in interest tends to be the plaintiff's attorney,
rather than shareholders or the corporation.24 ° In such circumstances, it
is hardly surprising that "strike suits"-meritless actions brought for
their nuisance or settlement value-are not uncommon. An early study
confirmed that the costs of derivative claims far outweighed the
benefits. 4"
As a result of the dangers posed by derivative actions, substantial
procedural barriers have been erected. The complaint must be veri-
fied.242 The plaintiff must be a shareholder at the time of the wrong
complained of,243 and must continue to be a shareholder through termi-
nation of the action.244 The plaintiff first must demand that the board
bring the suit on behalf of the corporation, unless such a demand would
be futile,245 and, in some states, a demand on the shareholders is re-
quired. 24 '6 The plaintiff must adequately represent other sharehold-
240 It was recently reported that the noted plaintiff's attorney, Richard Greenfield,
sees no difficulty in rushing to the courthouse to file shareholder litigation because "it's
not uncommon for several shareholder suits to be filed almost simultaneously, and
judges usually name the first attorney to file as the lead counsel for the plaintiffs."
Amparano, Holders' Advocate: A Lawyer Flourishes by Suing Corporations for Their
Shareholders, Wall St. J., April 28, 1987, at 1, col. 1, 29, col. 2. It was also reported
that Greenfield's firm "maintains a list of clients and their stockholdings in order to be
able to file.quickly when the occasion arises." Id. at 29, col. 3.
241 See F. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVA-
TIVE SUITs 8-9 (1944). Although a subsequent study casts some doubt on Wood's con-
clusion, see Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Deriv-
ative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L. REV. 542, 567-69 (1980), this study has
itself been questioned, see Garth, Nagel & Plager, Empirical Research and the Share-
holders' Derivative Suit: Toward a Better-Informed Debate, 48 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1985, at 137, 146-47.
242 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S.
363, 365-66 (1966).
2s See Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S.
703, 708 (1974); FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1983); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6(1) (West 1969 & Supp. 1987); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 626(b) (McKinney 1986).
244 See Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995, 1002 (5th Cir. 1978); Tryforos v. Ica-
rian Dev. Co., 518 F.2d 1258, 1263 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1091
(1976); Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 1984); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324
A.2d 215, 219 (Del. Ch. 1974), modified on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975).
245 See Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp. 1318, 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 809 (Del. 1984); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 378-79,
329 N.E.2d 180, 185-86, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 504-05 (1975) affd in part and re-
manded on other grounds, 545 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1976); FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(c) (McKinney 1986); Comment, The Demand and Standing
Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 168, 168-70
(1976).
246 See, e.g., Bell v. Arnold, 175 Colo. 277, 280, 487 P.2d 545, 547 (1971); Cla-
man v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 73, 128 N.E.2d 429, 436 (1955); ARIz. R. Civ. P.
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ers. 41 In many states, the plaintiff must post security for expenses to
commence the action.""8 Once begun, the derivative action may not be
discontinued or settled without court approval.249
The ALI essentially takes the traditional approach to commence-
ment of derivative actions. It allows them subject to the usual proce-
dural restrictions,2 5 with minor deviations intended to facilitate the
bringing of such actions.25 ' The difficulty with traditional law and with
the ALI's approach, however, is that the procedural requirements for
commencing a derivative suit have not served to deter frivolous or strike
suits.2 52 As late as 1975, the Supreme Court continued to warn that:
[I]n this type of litigation . . . the mere existence of an
unresolved lawsuit has settlement value to the plaintiff not
only because of the possibility that he may prevail on the
merits, an entirely legitimate component of settlement value,
but because of the threat of extensive discovery and disrup-
tion of normal business activities which may accompany a
lawsuit which is groundless in any event, but cannot be
proved so before trial .... 253
As Part IV of this Article will argue, the proper approach does not
involve tinkering with the procedural elements of a derivative action,
but instead focuses on the substantive scope of the action.
23.1; MINN. R. Civ. P. 23.06; Comment, supra note 245, at 182-84.
247 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549-50 (1949);
Davis v. Comed, Inc., 619 F.2d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 1980); Youngman v. Tahmoush,
457 A.2d 376, 379 (Del. Ch. 1983); FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
248 See, e.g., Cohen, 337 U.S. at 552-53; Haberman v. Tobin, 626 F.2d 1101,
1104 (2d Cir. 1980); Suburban Water Sys. v. Superior Court, 264 Cal. App. 2d 956,
958, 71 Cal. Rptr. 45, 46 (1968); CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(e) (West 1977 & Supp.
1986); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1986).
249 See, e.g., Mokhiber ex rel Ford Motor Co. v. Cohn, 608 F. Supp. 616, 623-26
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd 783 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1986); Lewis v. Newman, 59 F.R.D. 525,
527-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Prince v. Bensinger, 244 A.2d 89, 93 (Del. Ch. 1968); FED.
R. Civ. P. 23.1; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(d) (McKinney 1986).
290 See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 7.02 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1986) [hereinafter TENT. DRAFT No. 6];
supra notes 242-49 and accompanying text.
291 The ALI eliminates the verification and security for expenses, see id.
§ 7.04(c), and shareholder demand requirements, see id. § 7.03(c). For verification,
the ALI substitutes an attorney signature requirement similar to FED. R. CIv. P. 11,
see id. § 7.04(a), and, in place of security, the ALI relies on a potential award of costs
and attorney's fees to deter bad faith actions, see id. § 7.05(a). Although the ALI does
not dispense with the contemporaneous ownership rule, it would use the date of disclo-
sure, rather than of actual consummation of the wrong, to determine standing. See id.
§ 7.02(a)(1).
252 See Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for De-
rivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745, 777-83 (1984).
2"3 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 742-43 (1975).
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The ALI's position on termination of derivative actions is also
problematic from a procedural perspective. Under current law, the
board has unquestioned authority, within the confines of the business
judgment rule, to terminate a derivative action if members of the board
are not implicated and recovery is sought from a third party.254 If di-
rectors are implicated, the board possesses the power of termination if
the board is sufficiently disinterested to require that demand be made
on the board prior to bringing the action and to require application of
the business judgment rule.255
Current law reflects three separate positions on the capacity of
special litigation committees to terminate derivative actions. The strict-
est view allows the committee to terminate a derivative action as long as
its members are independent, act in good faith, and have made a proper
investigation.256 A middle view requires judicial review of the merits of
the committee's decision to terminate in cases where demand on the
board is excused.2 57 The most liberal view generally requires judicial
review of the merits of the termination decision and gives no recogni-
tion to the committee's action.25'
The ALI would limit the board's power to terminate derivative
actions to cases where no member of the board, or other inside party, is
implicated.259 In any other context, the court would consider the recom-
mendation of a board or special litigation committee on the merits, tak-
ing into account such factors as the discounted value of the litigation to
the corporation and non-litigation related effects on the corporation's
25 See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264-
65 (1917); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903).
But see Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 319 (1936) (suggesting
that a derivative action against a third party may not be dismissed if the corporation is
yielding under duress to the "injurious and illegal action" of the third party). Ashwan-
der's unique facts, however, cause it to be distinguished in later cases terminating de-
rivative actions against other public authorities. See, e.g., Klotz v. Consolidated Edison
Co., 386 F. Supp. 577, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
25 See Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025, 1032-34 (2d Cir. 1982); Allison ex
rel General Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1121 (D.
Del.) affd, 782 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del.
1984).
258 See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 623-24, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996,
1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922, 926 (1979); accord Roberts v. Alabama Power Co., 404
So.2d 629, 632 (Ala. 1981).
2"7 See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981); Joy
v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 891 (2d Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); see
also Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 327 (N.C. 1987) (requiring judicial review on
merits whether or not demand is excused).
... See Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983).
259 See TENT. DRAFt No. 6, supra note 250, § 7.07(b) (requiring review on
merits of board's decision to dismiss a derivative action "[i]n the case of an action
against a director" (emphasis added)).
19871
56 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
business.260
The ALI's proposal overly restricts the power of the board. The
board's right and duty to manage the business affairs of the corpora-
tion, include the duty to manage affairs pertaining to litigation."' The
implication of a single member of the board is not thought to dis-
empower the board in other contexts,26 2 and should not do so in the
context of a derivative action. There is no justification for altering cur-
rent law and denying a disinterested majority of the board the capacity
to direct the corporation's litigation affairs.
In addition, with regard to the power of special litigation commit-
tees, the strict view appears to be the proper one.263 If a disinterested
majority of the board may terminate a derivative action, there seems to
be no reason why a disinterested litigation committee should not have
the same power. 64 Presumably, the members of such a committee will
generally be more distant from and, therefore, less likely to appease
interested directors than "disinterested" members of the board. At the
very least, if the board is sufficiently disinterested to require demand,
any special litigation committee should inherit the board's power under
current law to terminate a derivative action in accordance with the bus-
iness judgment rule.2"5 A contrary result would create a peculiar pen-
alty for an action taken beyond the law's requirements to eliminate any
vestige of conflict of interest.
26o See id. § 7.08.
261 See Allison v. General Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1117 (D. Del. 1985)
("Demand is required in order to assure compliance with the most fundamental princi-
ple of corporate governance-directors are answerable to the shareholders and are
charged with the duty and responsibility to manage all aspects of corporate affairs.");
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) ("A cardinal precept of the General
Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders,
manage the business and affairs of the corporation. . . . By its very nature the deriva-
tive action impinges on the managerial freedom of directors." (footnote omitted)).
262 For example, a disinterested majority of the board retains an enhanced pre-
sumption of good faith in the takeover context, see supra text accompanying notes 225,
and typically is empowered to authorize or ratify contracts between an interested direc-
tor and the company, assuming the board has knowledge of the material facts pertain-
ing to the interested director's situation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1)
(1983).
26s See, e.g., Steinberg, The Use of Special Litigation Committees to Terminate
Shareholder Derivative Suits, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 28 (1980) ("[T]he. . . com-
mittee should conduct itself so as to withstand strict judicial scrutiny.").
26 Id. at 28 ("[T]he wisest course of action would be to name only nondefendant,
disinterested, and independent persons to the special litigation committee. . . . [T]he
board should delegate binding, nonreviewable authority to the committee to investigate
and determine whether the suit is in the corporation's best interests." (footnote
omitted)).
265 See id. at 4-6.
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6. Scope of Liability
The ALI's approach to corporate governance, which increases the
likelihood that directors will be held personally liable for actions taken
in good faith, would make it more difficult to recruit talented direc-
tors.266 Perhaps cognizant of this criticism, the ALI recommends that a
director's liability for breach of the duty of care be proportionate to the
director's compensation during the year of the violation.267 This limita-
tion is significantly less generous than state statutes that have addressed
the problem.268 By merely limiting rather than disposing of director
liability except in special instances, the possibility that directors will be
risk-averse remains. 6 9 In addition, mere limitation of liability is an in-
adequate cure for the concerns underlying duty of care liability.
7. Corporate Control Transactions
In Part VI of its corporate governance project, the ALI plans to
address corporate control transactions, which are crucial to corporate
governance in the age of finance corporatism. The ALI's proposal is
still in a formative stage.
The ALI's approach to regulating the capacity of a target's board
to defend against unsolicited acquisition proposals generally tracks cur-
266 See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that the
threat of liability for ordinary negligence might create "incentives for overly cautious
corporate decisions"); Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 333, 200 A.2d 398,
401 (1964) (noting that if ordinary negligence were employed "it would realistically be
very difficult if not almost impossible to secure the services of able and experienced
corporate directors"). Fear of liability resulting from the increase in shareholder litiga-
tion has caused many directors to resign. See also Baum & Byrne, The Job Nobody
Wants, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56, 56-57 (reporting mass resignations of outside
directors from corporate boards since 1984 when a company is unable to secure liability
insurance); ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 7.17 comment c (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1987) ("liability may chill the
willingness of independent directors to serve") [hereinafter TENT. DRAFT No. 7].
267 See TENT. DRAFT No. 7, supra note 266, § 7.17(a). The ALI would allow
implementation by an enabling statute "that authorizes the inclusion of a limitation on
damages in a corporation's certificate of incorporation," id. § 7.17(b)(1), or "a provi-
sion in a certificate of incorporation that is adopted by a vote of disinterested sharehold-
ers [§1.11] after appropriate disclosure concerning the provision," id. § 7.17(b)(2).
28 For example, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have eliminated the
director's liability for damages based on an objective, negligence standard. Each state
requires at least recklessness. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e)(2) (West Supp.
1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 42, § 8364 (Purdon 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1(B) (1987); see also King,
supra note 233, at 129-32 (discussing statutes limiting director liability in Delaware,
Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia).
269 The ALI itself noted that if the threat of liability causes directors to be exces-
sively risk averse when making decisions, shareholders will be injured and the corpora-
tion will be less efficient. See TENT. DRAFT No. 7, supra note 266, § 7.17 comment c.
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rent law. Under the ALI's scheme, a target's board is at liberty to reject
an acquisition proposal as long as the dictates of the business judgment
rule are satisfied.270 If an acquisition proposal is made directly to a
target's shareholders, as in the case of a hostile takeover bid, the board
may defend against the offer without soliciting a shareholder vote as
long as its members "rational[ly] belie[ve] that their action is in the best
interests of the corporation's shareholders, considered as a group. "271
The only difficulty with the ALI's formulation would seem to be the
ALI's discounting of the interests of all corporate constituencies, other
than those of common stockholders.
The ALI also has recommendations with respect to various defen-
sive tactics. The ALI would allow a premium repurchase of shares on a
non-pro-rata basis only if: 1) the seller has "held the shares for a sig-
nificant period of time," or 2) the repurchase is approved by a disinter-
ested majority of shareholders, or 3) the repurchase is "necessary to
prevent immediate and substantial injury to the corporation," or 4)
"the repurchase is pursuant to a contract entered into at or prior to the
time the seller acquired the shares to be repurchased," or 5) the repur-
chase is "pursuant to a general repurchasing program that does not
result in a disproportionate amount of the shares being repurchased
from a single person or small group. '272 The ALI's recommendation
sensibly helps to guard against greenmail, but allows for premium re-
purchases when they are necessary to defend a target against even
greater evils.
The ALI proposes regulating the issuance of lock-up options, 273
and would require a shareholder vote to grant such options.274 Current
law allows a target's board to grant lock-up options without share-
holder consent, subject to the restrictions of the business judgment
rule.275 The ALI's approach represents a slight and perhaps unneces-
270 See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 6.01 (Advisory Group Draft No. 9, 1987) [hereinafter DRAFT No. 9]
("The board of directors, in the exercise of its business judgment . . . may approve,
reject, or decline to consider a proposal . . . to engage in a transaction in control."
(citations omitted)).
2'71 Id. § 6.01 comment d(3).
2172 See id. § 6.04.
273 See id. § 6.05(b). A lock-up option is an option granted by a target to a pro-
spective purchaser to buy assets or stock of the target at a negotiated price. See, e.g.,
Mobil v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 1981) (describing the lock-up
option granted by Marathon to U.S. Steel).
2174 See DRAFT No. 9, supra note 270, § 6.04 comment c(2).
275 Compare Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 759-60 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983) (validating lock-up option) and Crouse-Hinds Co.
v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1980) (same) with Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986) (invalidating
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sary extension of the restrictions imposed by current law but allows,
without requiring a shareholder vote, the granting of no-shop clauses276
and break-up fees, 27 7 which similarly advantage one bidder at the ex-
pense of others.278
The most significant weakness in the ALI's approach to corporate
control transactions appears to be that the ALI completely ignores the
abusive takeover tactics that plague this age of corporatism. That is
precisely why the ALI is unable to recommend severe restrictions on a
target's defensive tactics. Although it might be inappropriate for an or-
ganization such as the ALI to propose a comprehensive solution to
probleihs in the takeover context, Part IV of this Article will attempt to
articulate such a solution.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION
The problems of corporate governance in the age of finance corpo-
ratism will not be solved through tinkering with existing mechanisms,
as the ALI and others propose. These problems require a balanced,
comprehensive legislative solution. Any such scheme must protect
shareholders and other constituencies from the junk-bond, bust-up
tender offer and other equally abusive takeover tactics, eliminate the
restrictions on shareholder choice inherent in certain defensive takeover
tactics, and revive shareholder democracy as a check on arbitrary or
inefficient management.1 9 Only then can we be assured that corpora-
lock-up option). See generally Note, Lock-Up Options: Toward a State Law Standard,
96 HARv. L. REV. 1068, 1076-77 (1983) (discussing application of business judgment
rule to lock-up options).
217 A no-shop clause is an agreement by a target not to seek to solicit or to negoti-
ate with competing bidders. The validity of such agreements has been questioned. See,
e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184 (invalidating no-shop clause). But see Jewel Cos. v. Pay
Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1562 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding no-
shop clause).
277 A break-up fee is a fee paid to a disappointed bidder. Such a fee will be up-
held, like a lock-up option, only if it stimulates rather than retards a bidding contest.
Compare Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128, 1150-51 (D. Or. 1984)
(upholding break-up fee) with Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184 (invalidating break-up fee).
28 See DRAFT No. 9, supra note 270, §§ 6.05(b) comment a(2).
27 "What is . . . in order. . . is a legislative package carefully balanced between
restraints on raiders and restraints on targets, aimed at fairness to stockholders . .. ."
J. BROOKS, supra note 25, at 350. Moreover, even as ardent a proponent of the hostile
takeover as SEC Commissioner Joseph Grundfest, see, e.g., J. Grundfest & B. Block,
Stock Market Profits from Takeover Activity Between 1981 and 1986: $167 Billion Is
a Lot of Money (Sept. 28, 1987) (research paper in SEC news release), acknowledges
that "'the current system is not the best way'" and "'[w]e need a way to make
changes [in the structure and control of corporations] more civilly'." Grundfest Says
Study Shows Takeovers Sharply Increase Shareholder Wealth, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1487, 1488 (1987).
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tions will be run for the long-term benefit of their shareholders and
other corporate constituencies, rather than for the corporate raider or
entrenched management.28
280 The proposals that follow are in large measure based on The Shareholder
Protection and Elimination of Takeover Abuses Act of 1985, which the author pro-
posed in testimony before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. See Impact Hearings, supra note 102, at 35-44
(testimony of Martin Lipton). In that testimony, the author said that the proposed
legislation should be designed so that it:
[(1)] Does not add new regulation, but primarily accomplishes its objec-
tives through deregulation.
[(2)] Protects shareholders from takeover abuses by both takeover entre-
preneurs and entrenched managements.
[(3)] Assures all shareholders of fair and equal treatment and ample time
to make reasonable decisions as to their best alternatives in takeover
situations.
[(4)] Eliminates the universally condemned practice of greenmail.
[(5)] Preserves shareholder democracy and gives the holders of common
stock a meaningful opportunity to use the corporate proxy machinery to
prevent management entrenchment. A substantial shareholder will have
the same right as, and equal opportunity with, management to urge the
shareholders to change corporate policy or management.
[(6)] Does not deter or handicap takeover bids by companies that are pre-
pared to make fair and equal offers to all shareholders and permits cash
and securities tender offers to be made on an equal basis.
[(7)] Protects employees, customers, suppliers, pensioners and communities
against the disasterous [sic] effects of bust-up takeovers.
[(8)] Does not in any way interfere with the traditional role of the states
in corporate governance and leaves the business judgment rule to evolution
in the state courts.
[(9)] Eliminates abusive front-end loaded two-tier tender offers and creep-
ing open-market takeovers that were developed to give takeover entrepre-
neurs the upper hand, and thereby eliminates the need for takeover targets
to resort to shark repellents, crown jewel options, pac-man defenses, issu-
ance of blocking preferreds, poison pills, greenmail and other pejoratively
named defenses developed to try to counterbalance such takeover tactics.
[(10)] Preserves the ability of corporations to raise venture capital, use
innovative financing techniques, negotiate desirable mergers and acquisi-
tions and have all the free market acquisition and financing flexibility they
presently enjoy.
[(11)] Enables corporations to reduce their concern with abusive bust-up
takeovers and devote greater time and resources to the long-term planning
that is essential to the preservation of the preeminent position of American
industry in a worldwide economy.
[(12)] Creates an even playing field on which free market forces and the
competitive skills of corporate managements can assure that our public
corporations and national assets are managed by the best people and are
devoted to the uses that are most favored by free market forces.
Id. at 11-13.
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A. Restricting Abusive Takeover Tactics
1. Partial Bids
Anyone wishing to effect a takeover should be required to declare
her intentions in a timely fashion and to purchase 100% of the target at
a uniform price. To accomplish this, securities laws should be amended
to require that no more than 5% of a company's common stock be pur-
chased except by tender offer for all of the company's common stock. In
addition, the Section 13D disclosure threshold should be lowered to
2%,2"' with the proviso that no more than 2% of a company's stock can
be purchased until after a 13D statement is filed.282 Purely passive in-
stitutional investors would be allowed to purchase up to 10%, but
would thereafter be prohibited from changing their intent and making
a tender offer. This proposal would prevent creeping acquisitions,
"sweeping the street,"2 8 partial bids, and two-tiered tender offers.
281 Currently, any person acquiring over 5% of a company's stock must file a 13D
disclosure document with the Securities and Exchange Commission within 10 days. See
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982).
22 Representatives Dingell (D-Mich.) and Markey (D-Mass.) have introduced
legislation with many provisions that parallel the author's proposals for legislation. See
H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. H2540 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1987)
(Tender Offer Reform Act of 1987). The Dingell-Markey bill would prohibit accumu-
lations over 10% except by tender offer but would not require that the tender offer be
for 100% of the target. See id. at § 13. It would require the filing of a 13D Statement
within 24 hours of crossing the 5% threshold, with a 2-day prohibition on purchasing
after crossing the threshold. See id. at § 4. The Dingell-Markey bill would also pro-
hibit purchases for 30 days following the termination of a tender offer, see id. at § 11,
and would thus discourage "sweeping the street." Other takeover reform proposals have
been sponsored by Representatives Lent (R-N.Y.) and Rinaldo (R-N.J.), see H.R.
2668, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H4558 (daily ed. June 11, 1987) (Se-
curities Trading Reform Act of 1987), and Senator Proxmire (D-Wis.), see S. 1323,
100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S7601 (daily ed. June 4, 1987) (Tender Offer
Disclosure and Finance Act of 1987). While expressing certain reservations, the author
has taken the position that the Dingell-Markey, Lent-Rinaldo, and Proxmire bills
"provide[] a sound basis on which to build a new takeover law." Testimony of Martin
Lipton, supra note 72, at 2.
283 Representative Dingell noted that "shareholders have insufficient time and in-
formation in the face of unregulated acquisition programs, and that some groups of
shareholders are unfairly disadvantaged, because of the speed within which the transac-
tions occur or the ability to participate on the same basis as other shareholders." 133
CONG. REc. E1564 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1987). Dingell specifically criticized these con-
ditions as arising from the "sweeping the street" transactions that were the subjects of
Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985) and SEC v. Carter
Hawley Hale Stores, 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985). See id. Section 11 of the Dingell-
Markey bill, see supra note 282, would prohibit sweeping the street after termination
of a tender offer, as in Hanson, by interposing a 30-day cooling-off period after termi-
nation of a tender offer.
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2. Timing
As currently structured, the tender offer process gives a target's
management a minimum of only twenty business days to evaluate a bid
and to consider alternatives.2"4 This time frame should be extended to
120 calender days.2 5 Such an extension would give the board a realistic
opportunity to determine whether the target is best served by remaining
independent or, if a sale is desired, whether the first offeror has made
the most advantageous bid and would give the board sufficient time to
solicit proxies making complete disclosure of the available alternatives.
In addition, no tender offer should be allowed to commence unless
the bidder has actual commitments for all the financing needed to con-
summate the purchase.2 86 Tender offers conditional on financing or
founded on "highly confident" letters are transparent ploys that allow
putting the target "in play" even if the bidder has no intention of con-
summating the purchase.28 7 Such maneuvers contribute nothing to the
long-term well-being of corporate America, and simply cater to the de-
sire for immediate, speculative profit.
28 8
3. Voting
Currently, target shareholders feel compelled to tender to avoid the
risk of being left with minority shares after the takeover. Although par-
tial and two-tiered bids are egregiously coercive in this respect, there is
an element of coercion in every tender offer.289 Therefore, within the
120-day tender offer period, the target's shareholders should have the
opportunity to vote on the proposed tender offer. Only shareholders
who were such at least 60 days prior to the announcement of the tender
offer should be allowed to vote. If the bidder does not receive a majority
28 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1987).
285 Section 9 of the Dingell-Markey bill, see supra note 282 would lengthen the
tender offer period to 60 days. Another study recommended a 44-day period to consider
a partial bid. See TENDER OFFERS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 82, at 24-26
(LeBaron Commission findings).
18 See Impact Hearings, supra note 102, at 673-74 (statement of Felix Rohatyn).
287 See Impact Hearings, supra note 102, at 123-24 (statement of Louis Lowen-
stein); Bianco, How Drexel's Wunderkind Bankrolls the Raider, Bus. WK., Mar. 4,
1985, at 90, 91 (noting that purported junk financing arrangements are often a prelude
to greenmail).
288 See Coffee, supra note 111, at 106 n.297 (Many parties have enormous incen-
tives to participate in a tender offer, even if there is no intention of actually consum-
mating the deal. For example, in Pantry Pride's $1.7 billion acquisition of Revlon, over
$200 million was charged merely for transaction costs.).
288 See Bebchuk, supra note 81, at 1717-33; Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal
of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 679-80
(1984); Takeover Bids, supra note 116, at 113-14.
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of the shares voted, the bidder should be required to withdraw the
tender offer.2 90 If a majority of pre-existing shareholders desire to re-
main independent, the offer will be defeated. If a majority votes for the
tender offer, dissenters can simply tender after the will of the majority
has become known.29'
This approach allows the target's shareholders, rather than the
takeover bidder, to determine the target's fate. As a consequence, a bid-
der will no longer be able to make a highly leveraged offer, "force" the
target's shareholders to tender, and then treat the target's remaining
shareholders, assets, and employees as it wishes.
4. Junk Bonds
Any proposal for reform in the takeover arena must address the
threat that junk-bond financing poses not only to the vitality of individ-
ual corporations, but also to the national economy.292 To discourage
junk-bond, bust-up takeovers and other junk-financed leveraging, the
tax code should be amended to eliminate the deductibility of interest on
junk bonds issued to finance hostile takeovers or issued by a company
in exchange for its own equity. 293 In addition, in order to strengthen
the national savings system, federally regulated or insured institutions
should be barred from holding more than 10% of their capital in junk
bonds.
29 4
5. Institutional Shareholders
Institutional investors, arbitrageurs, and other market profession-
als are the crucial de facto control persons in the age of finance corpo-
290 For an alternative scheme that also seeks to reduce coercion, but emphasizes
voluntary private sector reform, see Fogg, Takeovers: Last Chance for Self-Restraint,
HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 30, 38, 40.
291 Eliminating coercion of target shareholders through a voting scheme was sug-
gested in Bebchuk, supra note 81, at 1752-64.
292 See supra text accompanying notes 91-102; see also Impact Hearings, supra
note 102, at 685 (statement of Felix Rohatyn) (noting that much of this paper, which
has been accumulated by some of the weaker financial sectors, has never been tested in
a period of economic downturn). In 1986, 3% of below-investment-grade debt issues
defaulted, an increase from 1.5% over previous years. At present, over $4 billion in
junk bonds from 36 companies may be vulnerable to default. See Sheppard, Should
Junk Bond Interest Deductions Be Disallowed?, 34 TAx NOTES 1142, 1142-46 (1987).
293 Several similar proposals have been discussed in Congress. For example, Con-
gressman Pickle (D-Tex.) at one time opposed deductions on certain issues of junk
bonds whether used offensively or defensively. See Sheppard, Jake Pickle's Junk Bond
Proposal, 27 TAx NOTES 864, 864 (1985).
294 As an example of overexposure, Columbia Savings and Loan, as of June 30,
1986, owned $2.33 billion in junk bonds, representing 28% of its total portfolio. See
Coffee, supra note 111, at 45 n.120.
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ratism.295 The record suggests that their energies have heretofore been
focused on securing short-term gain at the expense of long-term consid-
erations.296 To reverse this trend, the tax code should again be amended
to impose a graduated tax, based on length of holding, on profits from a
security position of $5 million or more held less than five years. Specifi-
cally, short-term profits of such large holders should be taxed at the
following rates: 60% on positions held for not more than one year; 50%
on positions held for not more than two years; 45% on positions held
for not more than three years; 40% on positions held for not more than
four years; and 35% on positions held for not more than five years.2 91
The graduated tax would help shift the focus of institutional in-
vestors from the short to the long term, thereby harnessing the energy
of a powerful group of professionals for improved corporate govern-
ance. A longer-term perspective will encourage institutional investors to
bridge the gap between ownership and control by monitoring the ability
of management to achieve the valuable long-term goals of expanding
the enterprise and improving productivity. This focus, in turn, will in-
crease the long-term value of corporate equity.
B. Defensive Tactics
If the foregoing proposals are enacted to eliminate takeover abuses
and impose needed long-term investment objectives on institutional in-
vestors, then the takeover defenses currently used to combat such abuses
will no longer be justified. Standing alone, defensive maneuvers deprive
target shareholders of an effective voice in corporate governance and
should be eliminated. Such mechanisms, moreover, may insulate man-
agement from shareholder discipline and should be prohibited. This
Article, therefore, proposes that a number of limitations on defensive
tactics accompany the prohibitions on abusive takeover tactics already
suggested.
Reform in this area should begin with the shareholder voting pro-
cess. National stock exchanges and other organized trading markets
should enact the following as prerequisites to listing. First, a listed
company should adhere to the one-share, one-vote concept by disallow-
2'9 See Fogg, supra note 290, at 31.
296 See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
29 Warren Buffett has proposed a 100% tax on profits from stock positions held
less than one year. See Buffett, How to Tame the Casino Society, Wash. Post, Dec. 4,
1986, at A23, col. 3; cf. Fogg, supra note 290, at 38 (focusing on a 5% stock threshold
limit instead of a tax scheme); Impact Hearings, supra note 102, at 124, 673 (state-
ment of Louis Lowenstein) (supporting a 5% voting share threshold as not restrictive
on traditional investors).
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ing non-voting or low-voting common stock.2"' Second, a listed com-
pany's directors should be elected annually, thereby disallowing stag-
gered boards. Finally, shark-repellent provisions in corporate charters
that require supermajority shareholder votes to approve mergers should
be proscribed.
With limitations on abusive takeovers in place, there no longer
will be a justification for structural defenses that treat common stock-
holders unequally or are triggered by a change of control, such as
poison pills, lock-up options, and fair-price provisions.299 Such defen-
sive tactics should be eliminated, giving target shareholders the oppor-
tunity to determine the fate of takeover bids.
Once the detrimental effects of takeovers are mitigated, the contin-
ued use of greenmail, a defensive tactic that absorbs enormous amounts
of the target's resources, has no justification. 0 ° Legislative reform must
include proscription of selective repurchases by a company of its own
shares.3 O0
C. Directors' Liability
A remaining area requiring reform involves the liability of the di-
rector under state law. With the proposed legislative program in place,
directors will be free to act in the best interests of the corporation and
all its constituencies, and it should be presumed that shareholders con-
cur in their decisions. Therefore, this Article proposes that directors be
protected by state law from monetary liability arising from breach of
"' Section 3 of the Dingell-Markey bill, see supra note 282, would also require
one-share, one-vote for trading on a national securities exchange or through a national
securities association. For a different view suggesting a middle course between banning
dual-class capitalization and unrestricted capital structuring, see Dent, Dual Class
Capitalization: A Reply to Professor Seligman, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 725, 736,
746-52 (1986) (arguing that the SEC may not have the power to forbid dual-class
capitalization, and that there are efficiency arguments that favor such a structure).
29 Sections 12 and 14 of the Dingell-Markey bill, supra note 282, would also
prohibit such tactics as poison pills and lock-up options.
300 See supra text accompanying notes 133-38 (discussing greenmail). As an ex-
ample of the enormous sums involved, between 1979 and 1984 target firms spent $5.5
billion in share repurchase transactions, with an aggregate premium over market price
of more than $1 billion. See Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and Greenmail: Is
New Legislation Needed?, 19 GA. L. REV. 281, 282 (1985).
301 Section 5 of the Dingell-Markey bill, supra note 282, would also prohibit
greenmail, defined as a repurchase from a 3% holder of less than two years at a price
exceeding the average market price during the 30 days preceding the repurchase, unless
a majority of the company's shareholders approve or the same offer is extended to all
shareholders. See also Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment
on Two Models, 96 YALE L.J. 295, 297 (1986) ("[T]arget stock buybacks are unlikely
to increase shareholder wealth as a general matter and, on a shareholder wealth crite-
rion, should not be permitted as a defensive tactic.").
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fiduciary duty unless it can be proven that the director's actions were
taken in bad faith or provided an improper personal benefit.30 2 Deriva-
tive suits, moreover, should be permitted only if directors have profited
personally at the corporation's expense.30 3 Bad faith should be con-
strued as intentional or reckless disregard of duty rather than as "gross
negligence."
This proposal would relieve a number of problems that plague
corporate governance, such as the current director-officer insurance cri-
sis, the difficulty in recruiting talented directors, and the trend toward
risk-aversion that some commentators fear in the wake of recent deci-
sions and proposals for expanding the director's duty of care. 0 It will
also mitigate the judiciary's role of second-guessing directors' judg-
ments. Consequently, a management that is truly accountable to share-
holders will be able to concentrate on running the enterprise rather
than devoting time and energy to avoiding liability.
D. The Accountability of Managers
After the distorting effects of takeover tactics and defenses are re-
moved, corporations will be able to concentrate on operating their busi-
nesses. A broad legislative program must still address the issue posed at
the outset of this Article: given the contemporary nature of corporatism,
what is the best method of ensuring proper corporate governance? In
the age of finance corporatism, the answer lies in promoting manage-
ment accountability through a renewal of shareholder democracy.
Commentators have suggested that shareholder democracy in cor-
porate governance is inherently unworkable because shareholders gen-
erally lack the interest to become involved in corporate governance.305
302 Several states have enacted statutes to reduce director exposure to liability. In
Indiana, for example, there is no liability for breach of the duty of care absent "willful
misconduct or recklessness." See Special Project Note, Protecting Corporate Directors
and Officers: Insurance and Other Alternatives, 40 VAND. L. REV. 775, 803 (1987)
(citing IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e)(2) (Burns Supp. 1986)). Delaware has
amended its corporate code to permit shareholder adoption of provisions limiting direc-
tors" liability for damages for breach of duty of care. See id. at 803-04.
303 The Delaware statute still imposes liability "for any transaction from which
the director derived an improper personal benefit" as well as for the making of unlaw-
ful dividend payments or unlawful stock purchases or redemptions. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986). Discussion of technical violations related to the im-
pairment of a corporation's capital is beyond the scope of this Article.
I" See, e.g., Wriston, "Risk," the American Law Institute, and the Corporate
Director, in ANALYSIS, supra note 210, at 7, 14 ("if directors are penalized for taking
business risks, our system is in jeopardy").
305 See Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Con-
tract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1405-08 (1985) (expressing concern that the average
stockholder lacks the requisite information and mechanisms to monitor and control
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Such apathy has been viewed as rational.3" 6 Corporate elections have
been parodied as "procedurally much more akin to the elections held by
the Communist party of North Korea" than real democratic elections
because "they normally provide only one slate of candidates."3 The
institutional investor's rise to prominence in the age of finance corpo-
ratism calls into question the conventional wisdom. Once institutional
investors adopt a more long-term profit perspective, these investors will
possess a significant stake in corporate governance and will have
greater incentive to become involved in corporate decision-making. Such
investors, moreover, possess the skills necessary to assert their influ-
ence.308 Thus, strengthening shareholder democracy remains the most
promising method of promoting management accountability and im-
proving corporate governance in the current age.
To promote the accountability of management, this Article pro-
poses that the federal securities laws be amended to allow any share-
holder, or group of shareholders, with more than $5 million in market
value of the corporation's shares free and equal access.09 to the corpo-
ration's proxy machinery at the corporation's expense.310 Shareholders
management); Hetherington, supra note 163, at 253 ("The overwhelming majority of
the shareholding public probably prefers reading ball scores to proxy statements ....
If [small corporate shareholders] become dissatisfied with the performance of manage-
ment the best thing for them to do is sell.").
30' See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 108, at 1171 (stating that free-
rider problems render investor passivity to be in her self-interest); see also Kripke, The
SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW. 173, 175-78 (1981)
(noting that typical stockholder views herself as investor with power to sell rather than
as owner).
307 E. EPSTEIN, supra note 162, at 13.
308 Louis Lowenstein has suggested that shareholders be allowed to nominate and
elect 20% of the board in addition to the management slate. His avowed aim is to
"[e]ncourage [institutional investors] to participate in corporate governance before the
event, rather than voting with their feet after." L. Lowenstein, Beating the Wall Street
Rule with a Stick and a Carrot, Comments at Conference at Boston University 11
(May 1, 1987) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (drawn from
forthcoming book). The only difficulty with Lowenstein's solution is that it does not go
far enough. The institutions must be able to challenge management control, not merely
possess minority representation on the board.
309 Section 6 of the Dingell-Markey bill, see supra note 282, would provide free
access to the corporate proxy machinery to a holder of 3% of the voting power or of
$500,000 worth of shares, whichever is greater. See also Fogg, supra note 290, at 38
(suggesting that subjecting the takeover process to corporate proxy mechanisms would
further accountability).
310 When a policy issue is involved, a management group is entitled to charge to
the corporation reasonable expenses it incurred in soliciting proxies. This general rule
has been extended to expenses incurred by an insurgent group if it is successful in
obtaining control and the charge is approved by a majority of shareholders. See Stein-
berg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (in contest over policy, suc-
cessful insurgents may be reimbursed if both the board of directors and a majority of
stockholders approve); Johnson v. Tago, Inc., 188 Cal. App. 3d 507, 516-17, 233 Cal.
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with less than a $5 million stake would remain free to pursue indepen-
dent proxy solicitations. Because broad social issues are beyond the
proper scope of corporate governance,3 11 such proposals would not be
allowed at corporate expense.
Providing large shareholders, who have a substantial stake in cor-
porate governance, with access to the proxy machinery will ensure the
accountability of management far better than the current tender offer
process,312 which requires decision-making under conditions of extreme
time pressure-within twenty days. As a practical matter, this requires
target management to maximize the short-term value of the target's
shares in response to a hostile bid. The only real alternatives to a hos-
tile bid are a sale to a third party at a higher price or an internal
restructuring that raises the trading price of the target's shares. There
is little opportunity to explore whether the target would benefit over
the long-term by remaining independent and unrestructured. It is little
wonder that, in this pressurized environment, institutional shareholders
have historically sought the highest short-term profit and have even
considered it their duty to follow this course. 13
Substituting real shareholder democracy for the hostile tender offer
as a device for disciplining management has a number of advantages. It
allows corporate decision-making to proceed under conditions of nor-
malcy, rather than under the extraordinary pressures of the tender offer
process. Under the suggested program, a company can safely remain
independent and unrestructured if its shareholders believe this to be in
the company's long-term interest. A raider seeking speculative gain will
Rptr. 503, 507-08 (1986) (overturning lower court order that corporation pay expenses
of shareholders in midst of proxy contest on grounds that court may determine only
whether such a payment, after approval by shareholder majority, is reasonable, noting
that "[rlepayment is generally given only to the winners, be they management incum-
bents or successful insurgents"); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp.,
309 N.Y. 168, 173, 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (1955) (in a proxy contest over policy, "[tihe
stockholders ... have the right to reimburse successful contestants"); Annotation, Ex-
penses Incurred by Competing Factions Within Corporation in Soliciting Proxies as
Charge Against Corporation, 51 A.L.R.2d 873, 877 (1957).
.. Lack of expertise on the part of management and the anti-democratic tenden-
cies of corporate involvement in this area make it an inappropriate issue for corporate
governance. See supra text accompanying note 192.
312 See D. Walker, Some Perspectives for Pension Fund Managers (delivered at
NAPF Investment Convention, Eastbourne, England) (Feb. 27, 1987), at 8-10.
... To counter this view, § 10 of the Proxmire bill, see supra note 282, would
amend ERISA to provide that pension fund managers will not be liable for refusing to
accept a tender offer in the absence of gross negligence or willful malfeasance. Cf D.
Walker, supra note 312, at 5 ("trustees, in proper exercise of their responsibilities,
should take into account in determining the appropriate acceptance of risk not only the
interests of current and future pensioners but also the implications for the company
that has to pick up the tab if things go wrong").
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no longer be able to impose a sale or restructuring on a target. If a sale
or restructuring is desired by a company's shareholders, the company
can proceed to explore carefully all alternatives to its current organiza-
tion and select the one that is most advantageous.
Most importantly, a renewal of shareholder democracy and a de-
emphasis of the hostile takeover bid will free institutional shareholders,
the actual control persons in this stage of corporatism, from the impera-
tive of speculative short-term profits. Institutional shareholders will be
able to guide corporate management in the long-term interest of the
corporation and all its constituencies. To the corporation's benefit, its
shareholder constituency will remain relatively stable. The diversity of
its institutional owners, moreover, will ensure that a variety of views is
expressed over time, with the attendant benefits of pluralist corporate
democracy. The proposed reforms require that management run the
corporation for the long-term benefit of the enterprise, rather than for
the short-term creation of paper profits.
V. THE SECOND GENERATION PILL
The legislative program outlined in Part IV allows shareholders to
determine the fate of companies in today's overheated takeover environ-
ment. If a target's best long-term interests so dictate, the program frees
the target's board from having to choose among allowing a hostile
tender offer to succeed, selling the company to a white knight, or re-
structuring the company to increase short-term share values. Under the
program, shareholders can dictate that a target remain independent and
unrestructured.
Should corporations wish to take action on their own rather than
await enactment of such a legislative program, many of the same goals
can be accomplished directly through adoption of the second generation
share purchase rights plan, which like its predecessor will undoubtedly
be labeled a "poison pill."'314 Similar to its precursor, the second gener-
ation pill also contains a flip-over provision designed to guard against
second-step, squeeze-out mergers and bust-up takeovers. 15 The flip-
over, however, does nothing to deter raiders able to acquire majority
control and willing to forego a second-step merger. The second genera-
tion pill adds a status "flip-in" provision to protect against abusive par-
tial acquisitions. In the event a raider acquires 20% of a target, the new
314 The second generation pill was recently adopted by MCA, Inc., and Foster
Wheeler Corp. See New Pills Find Few Takers, CORP. CONTROL ALERT, October
1987, at 1, 5.
"' See supra text accompanying note 129.
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pill gives the target's shareholders, other than the raider, the right to
acquire common stock of the target at half-price.316 Thus, the flip-in
gives shareholders of the target, other than the raider, the right to cause
unacceptable dilution of the raider's holdings in the target.
The new pill may be redeemed by the company's board at a nomi-
nal price at any time prior to acquisition of a 20% stake by an acquir-
ing person. To prevent the second generation pill from hindering ad-
vantageous offers, and to decrease concerns regarding judicial
acceptance, the new pill provides that, under certain circumstances, a
special shareholders meeting will be held to determine whether the pill
should be redeemed. A bidder can avail itself of such a special share-
holders meeting if it: (a) makes a cash offer for all the target's shares;
(b) owns no more than 1% of the target's shares and owned no more
than 1% at the time it disclosed its intention to control or acquire con-
trol of the target; (c) has financing or financing commitments; (d) fur-
nishes an opinion, addressed to the target's shareholders, from a nation-
ally recognized investment banking firm that the price of its offer is
fair; and (e) agrees to bear half the costs of the special meeting.
In order to allow sufficient time to consider the bidder's proposal,
to seek and evaluate alternative proposals, to prepare proxy materials,
but also to avoid undue delay, the special shareholders meeting is re-
quired to be held not fewer than 90 days but not more than 120 days
after the bidder's request. The record date for the meeting would be set
in accordance with applicable by-law and charter provisions. 317 Thebidder may submit any information it desires in the company's proxy
316 Some early cases held that exclusion of the raider from the benefits of the flip-
in violated statutory proscriptions against discrimination among shares of the same
class. See Spinner Corp. v. Princeville Dev. Corp., No. 86-0701, slip op. at 6-7 (D.
Haw. Oct. 31, 1986), vacated, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 93,157
(D. Haw. Jan 30, 1987) (vacating prior proceedings as a consequence of settlement);
Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); R.D. Smith & Co. v. Preway, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 868, 873-75 (W.D. Wis. 1986)
(denying preliminary injunction because shareholders failed to prove likelihood of ir-
reparable injury). More recent cases, however, have held that the flip-in provision is
lawful because it constitutes discrimination among shareholders, which is not prohib-
ited by statute, rather than among shares. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS
Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 718 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637,
1653 (1987); Harvard Indus. v. Tyson, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 93,064, 95,294 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 1986); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Part-
ners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 847-48 (D. Minn. 1986) (finding flip-in lawful in accordance
with Minnesota statute that allows discrimination against shareholders within same
class), affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir.
1987).
... Absent statutory change, there is no method to prevent bidders and arbi-
trageurs from voting shares acquired after the bidder's request for a meeting. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213(a) (1983) (record date must be not more than 60 days
nor fewer than 10 days prior to date of meeting).
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materials or mail its own proxy materials. The target's board may also
solicit proxies and may give its opinion relating to such matters as the
fairness of the offer, the advisability of alternative transactions, and the
advisability of remaining independent and unrestructured. If a majority
of the company's outstanding shares are voted in favor of the bidder's
resolution, the new pill is redeemed, and the bidder may proceed with
its offer-at a cash price not less than the price voted on by the share-
holders-unaffected by the pill's provisions. Thus, under conditions
that ensure that a bidder is not abusing the tender offer process, the
second generation pill allows the target's shareholders to determine the
fate of the company after disclosure of all relevant information and
with sufficient time to consider and act on such information.
CONCLUSION
The contemporary stage of corporatism, that of finance corpora-
tism, poses both a great danger and a great opportunity for American
economic prosperity. The danger is clearly evident in the current wave
of abusive acquisitions, a trend that is a function of the financing mech-
anisms and market professionals that mark this phase of corporatism.
The opportunity presented is a chance to ensure our future economic
and social well-being by channelling economic energy from speculative
endeavors into productive ones.
This Article has described the complex problems that currently
threaten corporate America, such as the highly leveraged takeover and
other abusive offensive techniques, the concomitant difficulties created
for various corporate constituencies, the use of defensive tactics as a
response to offensive abuses, and the resulting disempowerment of
shareholders to make decisions that vitally affect their future. The Arti-
cle has also provided a survey of various proposals to reform corpQrate
governance. While each has ideas to contribute, they do not address the
far-reaching and long-term impact that the age of finance corporatism
has on our economy and society. The broad proposal for the reform of
corporate governance provided herein, however, incorporates these real-
ities. The suggestions address the financing mechanisms and market
professionals that currently dominate economic activity, as must any
successful proposal of reform. America must move to meet the challenge
posed by the age of finance corporatism, or lose a unique opportunity
to shape the attributes of the next stage of corporatism.
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POSTSCRIPT
The historic market crash of mid-October 1987 took place after
this Article was set in type. The overleveraged takeover and the short-
term oriented speculative activity associated with the takeover frenzy of
the eighties were, predictably, significant factors leading to the crash.31
As stated by Edward Yardeni, director of economics at Prudential-
Bache Securities: "[T]he bull market was largely fueled by mergers,
acquisitions and buy-backs. Stock values were driven up by corporate
entrepreneurs willing to pay above-market prices to control other cor-
porations." '19 Hopefully, the political and legislative reaction to the
crash will result in takeover reforms of the type urged in this Article.
318 In 1985 testimony before Congress, the author stated: "[Flundamentally we
are creating a system which historically has resulted in crashes, panics, and depressions.
We can go back to the 17th century to the tulip bubble; to the 18th century, to the
South Sea bubble; to the 19th century, with the money panics; and the 20th century, to
1929. I think we are again approaching a situation which gave rise to that kind of
problem." Impact Hearings, supra note 102, at 132.
319 Yardeni, The M & A Tax Scare Rattling the Markets, Wall St. J., Oct. 28,
1987, at 32, col.3, 32, cols. 4-5.
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